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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation focuses on two issues in Public Economics: public goods provision and voting
theory. It consists of three independent papers, with two using experimental methodology and one
using empirical data to examine the effectiveness of the models. In the following I briefly summarize
each of the papers.
Economists have long understood the challenges of providing proper incentives to groups, such
as divisions or teams of a firm, that produce a joint product. The first paper (chapter 1) proposes
a mechanism in which a firm creates a competitive environment for its two teams by awarding
prizes based on aggregate outputs produced by these two teams, and uses laboratory experiments
to examine how effectively it induces team members to contribute. The experimental results verify
the prediction that the proposed mechanism encourages a greater number of participants to make
contributions, compared to a simple profit-sharing scheme. I also find that participants contributed
significantly more when they believed that their team had lower output, which can be well explained
by a model that incorporates the effect of envy at the group level.
The second paper (chapter 2) is an experimental examination of information revelation in a
voting model. Typically parties can conduct public events, such as rallies or demonstrations that
reveal their level of support in hopes this might influence voter turnout and the outcome of the
election. How effective is this? I compare two information-revealing mechanisms in the Palfrey-
Rosenthal pivotal voter model: one through which active supporters show their support without
paying costs (“polls”), which can be viewed as cheap talk; the other where active supporters have to
pay their time (active participation in “campaigns”) or money (e.g., contributing to super PACs) to
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support their preferred candidates, thus providing more certainty about the actual level of support.
To capture the difference between the two mechanisms, I assume that polls reveal the distribution
of active supporters of a party, while the campaigns provide the actual numbers of the active
supporters of that party. There are two main experimental findings. (a) In most of the situations,
subjects followed the main ideas of the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model, with appropriately
responding to the cost of voting and the belief of being pivotal. (b) However, when subjects are
informed of being in an advantageous position by campaigns, their turnout becomes significantly
higher than the best response to their pivotality belief. This can be attributed to that leading in
an interim stage has a positive psychological impact on performance in tournaments.
The third paper (chapter 3) investigates candidates’ rallying strategies in two-party races. Like
chapter 2, it views campaign rallies as an information-revealing mechanism that allows candidates
to project images of strong current support among voters. By incorporating this mechanism into
the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model, this study can explain under what circumstances a
candidate should hold a rally and how that rally affects voters’ decisions regarding whether or not
to vote. The investigation hypothesizes that (a) when two parties are different in size but have
the same chances of strong base support, the larger party is more likely to hold a rally, while (b)
when the sizes of the two parties are equal but base support is unequal, the party with a smaller
probability of strong base support is more likely to hold a rally. These two hypotheses are supported
by the empirical analysis of the 1988, 1992, and 1996 U.S. Presidential elections.
To summarize, this thesis contributes to the literature on group incentive mechanisms, with
chapter 1 being the first experimental study on inter-team competition with an endogenously de-
termined prize level in a stage game. This thesis also contributes to the literature on voting
behavior and campaign strategy. Chapter 2 is the first experimental study on the effect of infor-
mation revealed through campaigns on voting behavior in the Palfrey-Rosenthal model. Chapter 3
supplements political science literature on campaigns by using pivotal-voter theory to analyze the
effect of holding rallies and how that effect influences candidates’ rallying strategy.
2
Chapter 2
Promoting Group Productivity: A
Tournament-Based Mechanism
2.1 Introduction
Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on team-based structures to improve employee pro-
ductivity (Manz and Sims, 1993; Brian, 1994; Mueller et al., 2000; Che and Yoo, 2001; Thompson
and Choi, 2006). However, economists have long understood the challenges of providing proper in-
centives to groups, such as divisions or teams of a firm, that produce a joint product—for example,
if team outputs are observable while individual outputs are unobservable, a free-rider problem may
emerge and provide insufficient incentives for efficient production.
In this paper, I propose an inter-team competition mechanism in which a firm creates a competi-
tive environment by awarding prizes based on aggregate outputs of the entire firm. This mechanism
captures the idea that in real-world organizations individual employee earnings depend on aggre-
gate outputs produced by all employees, and a firm can transfer resources from its team with
inferior performance to its team with superior performance. For example, employees at DuPont re-
ceive bonuses and company stock rewards based on individual and company performance (DuPont,
2002). Fuji Xerox developed two technologies in parallel for its color copier project and then
transferred resources of the non-selected technology team to the selected one (Birkinshaw, 2001).
In addition to the theoretical study, I conduct laboratory experiments to examine how effectively
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the proposed mechanism induces team members to contribute their efforts. There are two main
experimental findings. First, contributions were inefficient when only team outputs were observable.
More importantly, the experimental results confirm the prediction that the proposed competition
mechanism encourages a greater number of participants to make contributions and mitigates the
free rider problems, compared to a simple profit-sharing scheme. Second, experimental data show
that participants contributed significantly more when they believed that their team had lower
output. This kind of behavior has been discussed in literature such as Adams (1963), Homans
(1974), and Mui (1995), and has been found in the laboratory by Halevy et al. (2010). The main
idea is that people compare their economic status, and those with relatively low status suffer utility
losses and may take actions to improve their relative status. People suffering utility losses from the
relatively low status is characterized as envy (Mui, 1995). I therefore incorporate the effect of envy
produced by the members of the team with lower output into the benchmark model that considers
only monetary payoffs. After taking into account the envy effect at the group level, the model fits
my experimental data very well.
To provide proper incentives to groups, a number of devices have been tested and reviewed in
the literature, with inter-team competition increasingly used as an incentive scheme. There are two
main reasons for considering inter-team competition mechanisms. First, inter-team competition is
commonly used in real-world companies. Empirically, companies that use inter-team competition
approaches include 3M, GM, P&G, IBM, and HP (Peters and Waterman, 1988); Motorola (Carroll
and Tomas, 1995); Rubbermaid, DuPont, and Fidelity (Kanter et al., 1997); Ericsson, HP, Spirent,
Fuji Xerox, SEB, Skandia, Volvo, and Telstar (Birkinshaw, 2001); and Apple (Purcher, 2011).
Second, theoretical studies such as Rapoport and Bornstein (1987) and experimental studies such
as Erev, Bornstein, and Galili (1993), Bornstein and Erev (1994), Nalbantian and Schotter (1997),
and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) have shown that inter-team competition can effectively
increase individual effort and mitigate free-rider problems. More importantly, they find that inter-
team competition mechanisms outperform other incentive schemes such as intra-team profit sharing
and target-based schemes (Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997).1
1In an intra-team profit sharing scheme, all revenue generated by the team is shared equally by all team members
of this team. In a target-based scheme, there is a revenue target set exogenously for a team. If the target is achieved,
all team members share in all of the revenue generated, while if the target is not attained, a penalty is paid by each
team member—that is, each team member is paid a relatively low penalty payoff.
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In all theoretical and experimental studies mentioned above, prize levels are exogenously fixed,
whereas in practice, when teams within a firm such as Fuji Xerox (Birkinshaw, 2001) or DuPont
(DuPont, 2002) compete, the size of the prize is itself endogenous and depends upon aggregate
output. To my best knowledge, my paper is the first experimental study on inter-team competition
with an endogenously determined prize level in a stage game.2 Marino and Za´bojn´ık (2004) also
propose a tournament-based model in which compensation contracts for individual employees are
based on the aggregate output of the entire firm rather than on a fixed amount. The primary
differences between my paper and Marino and Za´bojn´ık’s work are as follows. First, Marino and
Za´bojn´ık (2004) work only on a theoretical application, while my main interest is to test the
proposed mechanism and study worker behavior in the laboratory, and my experimental results
show that the model that considers only monetary payoffs fails to explain the findings in the
laboratory. Second, to support more accurate examinations of worker behavior, my model entails
a binary choice, while Marino and Za´bojn´ık’s model considers a strictly convex cost function.3 In
Marino and Za´bojn´ık’s model, the individual teams serve as each other’s budget breakers that help
solve free-rider problems, as shown in Holmstrom (1982). But Holmstrom’s theory does not apply
to my model due to my non-strictly convex cost function. In contrast, in my model, individual
teams serve to increase each other’s marginal benefit from contributing efforts, thus helping to
achieve Pareto optimality under Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 I present a benchmark model
and discuss various mechanism hypotheses, and in Section 3 I introduce the experimental design.
Experimental results are reviewed in Section 4.1, and in Section 4.2 I examine the effect of group
envy. A conclusion is offered in Section 5.
2.2 The Benchmark Model
Consider a firm that consists of two teams, A and B, each with n members indexed i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Each member can choose one of two effort levels xhi ∈ {0, 1}, h = A,B. That is, each worker can
2Guillen and Merrett (2010) also propose an inter-group competition scheme (ICS) with endogenously determined
prize levels. In their experiments, subjects played 10 rounds of the ICS; however, the subjects remained in the same
group for the entire 10 rounds. According to their experimental design, subjects played repeated games, where the
issues are different.
3That is, in my model workers can choose to contribute or not contribute their efforts, but they cannot determine
the sizes or amounts of their contributions.
5
choose between contributing (i.e., xi = 1) or not contributing (i.e., xi = 0). The output of team
h is yh =
∑n
i=1 x
h
i + ǫ
h, where ǫh are i.i.d. random variables across the two teams, according
to a distribution function F (·) that has a density f(·) and mean zero. Effort cost is defined as
c(xhi ) = x
h
i . The firm is assumed as selling its output for price g with 1 < g < n, so firm revenue is
g(yA + yB).
The aggregate output produced by the two teams can be viewed as the firm’s total resources.
Each worker’s payoff is based on the resources allocated to her team by the firm. For simplicity,
I assume that the payoff of a team equals the resources allocated to that team times the price g.
Assume that yA and yB are observable by the firm, but the individual effort levels xAi and x
B
j and
the noise terms ǫh are not. Firms generally use a simple profit-sharing scheme in which a firm
allocates to a team, say team A, the resources generated by team A, and equally splits the payoff
of team A among the members of team A; however, this will result in a free-rider problem.
Here I will follow Marino and Za´bojn´ık (2004) to propose a team-tournament mechanism
in which a firm creates competition between its teams for the firm’s internal resources. The team
with higher y is viewed as the winning team, and the team with lower y is viewed as the losing
team. Regarding the internal reallocation of resources, the firm transfers a µ share of resources
generated by the losing team to the winning team, meaning the total resources of the winning team
(in this case, team h) can be expressed as yh + µym, and the total resources of the losing team
(m) can be expressed as (1−µ)ym. Since the firm is limited to awarding all of the resources of the
losing team to the winning team, 0 6 µ 6 1. Here I will use µ = 1 to represent a pure tournament.4
Pareto-optimal effort levels
Pareto-optimal effort level is first examined for each worker, with efficient effort levels found by
maximizing the expected total surplus over a choice of xhi , i = 1, ..., n, h ∈ {A,B}. Therefore,
max
xAi ∈{0,1},x
B
i ∈{0,1}
gE
(
yA + yB
)
−
n∑
i=1
xAi −
n∑
i=1
xBi
Solving the maximization problem gives a unique profit-maximizing effort level as
xhi = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n, h = A,B. (2.1)
4See Marino and Za´bojn´ık (2004) pp. 713-714
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Simple profit-sharing equilibrium
Before proving the ability of the proposed team-tournament mechanism to solve the free-rider
problem, it is instructive to show that the free-rider problem exists under a simple profit-sharing
scheme. For firms that use the simple profit-sharing scheme, the lack of a tournament environment
means that µ = 0. From worker i’s point of view, the following maximization problem must be
solved:
max
xhi ∈{0,1}
g
n
E

xhi + n∑
j 6=i
xhj + ǫ
h

− xhi
where 0 < g
n
< 1 < g. Parameter g
n
is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from contributing
effort to produce output. Since g
n
< 1, each worker’s unique effort level is
xhi = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, h = A,B. (2.2)
Comparing (2.2) with (2.1) yields the result that under simple profit sharing, workers contribute
less than the efficient level of effort. Intuitively, since i’s payoff depends on team output rather
than personal output, i has an incentive to free-ride. For the sake of convenience, I will call any
player whose xhi = 0 a free rider, and any player whose x
h
i = 1 a contributor.
The team tournament
We now examine the efficiency characteristics of the team tournament scheme. Let NA denote
the number of contributors on team A, and NB the number of contributors on team B. The
probability team A wins against team B is assumed to be
Pr(yA > yB) = Pr(ǫB − ǫA < NA −NB)
=
1
2
+
NA −NB
2n
(2.3)
which increases for NA and decreases for NB. It is easy to find a distribution function F (·) that
satisfies (2.3). For example, given that n = 2, then
f(ǫh) =


1 if ǫh ∈ (−1,−12 )
⋃
(12 , 1), h = A,B,
0 otherwise.
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This looks like the pdf of the bimodal distribution and satisfies (2.3). To examine the tournament
effect, µ is set as 1, therefore, from the point of view of i as a member of team A, the maximization
problem to be solved is expressed as:
max
xAi ∈{0,1}
πAi =
(
1
2
+
xAi +
∑n
j 6=i x
A
j −
∑n
k x
B
k
2n
)
g
n
E

xAi + n∑
j 6=i
xAj +
n∑
k
xBk + ǫ
A + ǫB

− xAi
(2.4)
Following the main focus of team tournament literature, I will concentrate on a symmetric
equilibrium, in which all workers contribute the same effort level (a pure symmetric equilibrium),
or all workers contribute with the same probability (a symmetric mixed equilibrium). Symmetric
equilibria are summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Let Nh denote the number of contributors on team h, h ∈ {A,B}.
(a) The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the equilibrium N∗A = N
∗
B = 0 is that
g
n
6
2n
n+1 . That is, x
h
i = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n, h = A,B, which is the same as the result in the simple
profit-sharing equilibrium. For convenience, I will call this equilibrium a free-rider equilibrium.
Note that this condition is always satisfied given that g < n.
(b) The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the equilibrium N∗A = N
∗
B = n is
g
n
>
2n
3n−1 . That is, x
h
i = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n, h = A,B, which is the same as the Pareto-optimal effort
levels. For convenience, I will call this equilibrium a Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
(c) Suppose that i is a member of team A. In the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, all workers
contribute with a probability p ∈ (0, 1) given by:
nX
NB=0
n−1X
NA=0
pNA+NB (1− p)2n−1−NA−NB
 
n− 1
NA
! 
n
NB
!»„
1
2
+
1 +NA −NB
2n
«
g
n
(1 +NA +NB)
–
= 1 +
nX
NB=0
n−1X
NA=0
pNA+NB (1− p)2n−1−NA−NB
 
n− 1
NA
! 
n
NB
!»„
1
2
+
NA −NB
2n
«
g
n
(NA +NB)
–
.
Proof : See Appendix A.1.
A comparison of Proposition 1(b) with (2.1) shows that the efficient effort level can be achieved
by a tournament between two teams. From this section we have two hypotheses. To examine the
proposed tournament mechanism and the two hypotheses, I performed experiments, which will be
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described in the next section.
Hypothesis 1 Given that team output is observable but individual effort level is not, each worker
contributes less than the efficient level of effort.
Hypothesis 2 A two-team tournament mechanism with a payoff structure such as that shown in
(2.4) weakly increases workers to contribute greater effort.
2.3 Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two treatments: an experimental treatment (TT ) representing the
tournament scheme, and a control treatment (SPS) representing the profit-sharing scheme. To
test static game theory predictions, I followed the tendency among economists to randomly re-
match participants for each period since unchanged team composition (fixed matching) might give
incomplete information about the motivation of other participants, thereby altering the nature of
the equilibrium via reputation effects (Kreps et al. (1982)).5
The condition for Hypothesis 1 is that g
n
< 1, so that players have incentives to become free-
riders in the SPS treatment (Equation (2.2)). Note that under the condition g
n
< 1, the necessary
and sufficient condition for Proposition 1(a) is automatically satisfied, leading to the existence of the
free-rider equilibrium in the TT treatment. Also, according to Proposition 1(b), the condition for
Hypothesis 2 is that g
n
> 2n3n−1 in support of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the TT treatment. To
satisfy the conditions for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, I therefore set n = 4 and g = 3, resulting
in the MPCR = g
n
= 0.75. According to this setting, the free-rider equilibrium is predicted to occur
in the SPS treatment. For the TT treatment, if we focus on symmetric equilibria, this setting leads
to the existence of the free-rider equilibrium, the existence of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium, and
the existence of one symmetric mixed equilibrium where all players contribute with a probability
of 0.944 (Proposition 1(c)).6
2.3.1 SPS treatment
Each session of the SPS treatment consisted of 10 periods. At the beginning of every period,
each participant received a token worth 20 points as an initial endowment. In every period, each
5See Nikiforakis (2008) p. 93.
6I use numerical grid searches to show that there is only one symmetric mixed equilibrium for my parameters.
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of the 4 team members contributed 20 points of the initial endowment to either a common team
account or private individual account. Participants made decisions simultaneously and without
communication. They earned points in their private accounts plus the total amount of common
points multiplied by the MPCR. Earnings for any participant i in a given period is expressed as
πi = 20− xi + 0.75
(
xi +
3∑
h=1
xh
)
where xi ∈ {0, 20} represents the points contributed by i, and xh ∈ {0, 20} represents the points
contributed by i’s team member h, h ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
It is noteworthy that in the model the payoff for a team member is the equally shared payoff
of her team. The payoff of a team is the price times its output, and the output of a team is its
common points plus a random variable. In the experiment, however, the payoff of a team was the
price times its common points. This is because the theory does not change when using the price
times a team’s common points as that team’s payoff. More importantly, when compared to using
the price times a team’s output as that team’s payoff, it was easier to conduct experiments by using
the price times a team’s common points as that team’s payoff since the common points did not
consist of the random variable.
After making contribution decisions, participants could estimate the total number of points in
their common team accounts. If the estimate was the same as the actual value, each participant
earned an extra 2 points; they did not lose anything for incorrect estimates. Participants were
reminded of their contributions at the end of each period and informed of total team points,
personal earnings, and bonuses for the current period. Participants were randomly rematched with
others after each period.
2.3.2 TT treatment
In this treatment scheme, each session also had 10 periods, and participants were randomly matched
with others in each period. In the TT treatment, participants made contribution decisions similar
to those made by the SPS treatment participants, but with a different payoff structure. The
two teams competed after all participants made their contribution decisions, each with a winning
10
probability expressed as
1
2
+
1
20
∑4
i=1 x
A
i −
∑4
j=1 x
B
j
2n
as defined in Section 2. The number
∑4
i=1 x
l
i ∈ {0, 20, 40, 60, 80} represents the total number of
points in the common account of team l, l ∈ {A,B}.
Participants on the winning team earned all points in their private accounts, plus points in the
commonly held account multiplied by the MPCR, plus points in the competing team’s commonly
held account multiplied by the MPCR. Members of the losing team earned private account points
only. Earnings for participant i on team A in a given period are expressed as
πAi = 20− x
A
i +
(
1
2
+
1
20
xAi +
∑3
h=1 x
A
h −
∑4
j=1 x
B
j
2n
)
0.75

xAi + 3∑
h=1
xAh +
4∑
j=1
xBj


where xAi ∈ {0, 20}. Note that I used two teams’ common points, which did not consist of random
variables, as the reward for the members of the winning team. The reason for using teams’ common
points rather than teams’ output is the same as that given in the 3.1 subsection.
After contribution decisions were made, participants estimated the total number of points in
commonly held accounts for both teams. Participants earned 2 bonus points for correct estimates,
but did not lose anything for incorrect estimates. At the end of each period, participants were
reminded of their contributions and informed of their team’s total common points, the competing
team’s total common points, their personal earnings, and their bonus points.
2.3.3 Procedures
Ten experimental sessions took place in 2011 and three experimental sessions took place in 2012,
in the Missouri Social Science Experimental Laboratory of Washington University in St. Louis.
Each session lasted approximately one hour. One hundred and four participants were recruited
through the Missouri Social Science Experimental Laboratory subject pool. Of these, 80 were
randomly assigned to the TT treatment, and 24 to the SPS treatment. Each participant only
took part in one session. Participants were paid $5 for showing up on time and listening to the
instructions which varied for each treatment. Neutral language was used to write instructions
for the two treatments. After listening to the instructions, participants were asked to respond to
11
Table 2.1: Experimental participant and contributor data.
Session Number of Treatment Average Percentage of
participants Contributors of 10 Periods
1 8 TT 0.3375
2 8 TT 0.575
3 8 TT 0.3875
4 8 TT 0.725
5 8 TT 0.7125
6 8 SPS 0.5
7 8 SPS 0.1375
8 8 TT 0.625
9 8 TT 0.6875
10 8 TT 0.575
11 8 TT 0.4625
12 8 TT 0.4125
13 8 SPS 0.1125
control questions. The experiment began after responding to participant questions. The students
interacted via a computer network in the laboratory. Workstation partitions ensured anonymity
between individuals. Experiments were conducted using Fischbacher’s (2007) z-Tree. Participants
earned an average of $22.86, including the show-up fee. The point-to-dollar exchange rate was 25:1.
2.4 Results
I organize the discussion of my results as follows. In Section 2.4.1, I first compare the aggregate
contribution decisions in the TT and SPS treatments and investigate Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis
2. Then, I examine experimental data at the individual level by regression analysis. In Section 2.4.2,
I first examine the emergence of different outcomes in the TT treatments to see if the experimental
data are consistent with the predictions of the team tournament model. Next, I introduce the effect
of group envy to the team tournament model and examine its performance by comparing the data
with the quantal response equilibrium prediction.
2.4.1 Effort Decisions
Overall Contribution Decisions. The two treatments were compared in terms of average per-
centage of contributors per period across 10 periods, and this pooled treatment data are presented
12
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of average percentage of contributors for TT and SPS treatments.
in Figure 4.6. As shown, initially approximately half of the participants contributed effort under
SPS treatment, and sixty percent of the participants contributed effort under TT treatment. But
during the experiment, the percentage decreased in the SPS treatment, while the percentage re-
mained constant in the TT treatment. Next, I compared the average percentage of contributors
during each session. As shown in Table 2.1, the mean percentage during the TT sessions was
0.55 and during the SPS sessions 0.25.7 The Mann-Whitney test result indicates a statistically
significant difference between the two treatments (|z| = 3.197, p = 0.0014).
Individual Regression Analysis. I now turn from examining the data at the aggregate level to
investigating the data at the individual level by using regression analysis. The estimation method
is the probit method with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on individuals. This
permits both error heteroskedasticity and error serial correlation within cluster. Regression models
involve the following variables. The Contribution dummy dependent variable equaled 1 when a
7(0.3375 + 0.575 + 0.3875 + 0.725 + 0.7125 + 0.625 + 0.6875 + 0.575 + 0.4625 + 0.4125)/10 = 0.55; (0.5 + 0.1375 +
0.1125)/3 = 0.25.
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participant contributed 20 points to a common team account. Independent variables are as follows:
TT , a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations from treatment TT and 0 from treatment
SPS; Period, a variable for controlling time effects; SPS*Period and TT*Period, interaction terms
between Period, SPS and TT for testing whether the trends observed in Figure 4.6 are significant.
Table 2.2 presents the regression results for the effect of competition on contribution behav-
ior. Regressions 1, 2, and 4 show the positive significance of TT , implying that TT treatment
participants were significantly more likely to contribute than SPS participants, which is consis-
tent with the aggregate results. Further, the negative significance of Period indicates that team
member contributions declined significantly over time. However, when Period is separated into
SPS*Period and TT*Period, the former is still significantly negative, while the latter becomes
insignificant (regressions 3 and 4). The combined negative significance of Period, negative signif-
icance of SPS*Period, and insignificance of TT*Period indicate that declining contributions over
time were limited to the SPS treatment sessions—that is, the presence of competition prevented
a decrease in contributor percentage over time, thus confirming the data shown in Figure 4.6.
These findings for aggregate contribution decisions plus regression analysis data support both H1
(contributions were inefficient when only team output is observable) and H2 (creating competition
mitigates the potential of a free-rider problem). This result is summarized as follows:
14
Table 2.2: Contribution Behavior (Marginal Effects Reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
TT 0.300∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.197∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.091)
Period -0.014∗∗
(0.005)
SPS*Period -0.056∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.013) (0.010)
TT *Period -0.004 -0.010
(0.005) (0.005)
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Result 1. On average, the percentage of contributors in the TT treatment group was significantly
higher than that in the SPS treatment group. This percentage remained constant in the TT group
and decreased over time in the SPS. These findings support the hypothesis that creating competition
mitigates the potential for a free-rider problem.
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2.4.2 Inter-Team Competition and Group Envy
Table 2.3: Frequency (and percentage) of each (x, y) outcome in
the TT treatment
(x, y) 0 1 2 3 4
0 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 2 (0.02) 5 (0.05) 1 (0.01)
1 - 5 (0.05) 17 (0.17) 11 (0.11) 3 (0.03)
2 - - 9 (0.09) 23 (0.23) 6 (0.06)
3 - - - 10 (0.10) 6 (0.06)
4 - - - - 1 (0.01)
Note: (x, y) represent the numbers of contributors on two teams such that
x 6 y, where x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
The Puzzle. After comparing the TT and SPS treatment group contribution decisions, I ex-
amined the fit between the team tournament model and the TT treatment experimental data.
Theoretically, a symmetric equilibrium for the team tournament benchmark model presented in
Section 2.2 predicts that each team will have either zero or four contributors (pure symmetric
equilibria), or each team member will contribute at a probability of 0.944 (a symmetric mixed
equilibrium). The TT treatment had 10 experimental sessions, with each session consisting of 10
periods, thus yielding 100 outcome observations. Let (x, y) denote the numbers of contributors
on two teams such that x 6 y, where x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}; (x, y) outcome frequencies are shown
in Table 2.3. As shown, (0, 0) and (4, 4)—predicted as the most likely to occur when considering
pure symmetric equilibria—each occurred only once in the experiment. In terms of the symmetric
mixed equilibrium, the contribution probability of 0.944 predicts that (4, 4) is the most likely to
occur (probability of 63%); the actual data indicates a 1 percentage.
To clarify this inconsistency, I considered the beliefs of participants, not including themselves,
concerning the numbers of contributors on their own (denoted as J) and competing teams (denoted
as K), and investigated how these beliefs affected their contribution decisions. Note that J ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3} and K ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Theoretically, according to the benchmark model setting, for a
participant i, given any K, i will contribute only when J > 2, and given any J , i won’t change her
16
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of contributors in each case: data versus predictions
Note: Data [bars] and predictions [blue lines] of the benchmark model proposed in Section 2.2.
contribution behavior as K increases or decreases. This reason is that an increase in K decreases
the probability of winning a tournament of i’s team, but increases the monetary payoff i would win
if i’s team does win. These two effects of K offset each other.
During the experiment, participants were asked to state J and K in each period, generating
800 (J,K) pair observations.8 Figure 2.2 presents the contributor percentages given J and K: the
top left panel displays the J = 0 case, top right the J = 1 case, bottom left the J = 2 case, and
bottom right the J = 3 case. Each J = j panel consists of 5 bars, with each bar representing one
(J,K) case in which J = j and K ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. I will use the first bar in the J = 0 panel (top
left) as an example. The number above the bar, 39, indicates 39 observations for the (0, 0) case.9
The 0.077 bar height value indicates contributions from 3 of 39 observations for the (0, 0) case.10
That is, the 0.077 bar height represents that the percentage of contributors in the (0, 0) case was
8Recall that there were 10 sessions for the TT treatment, with each session consisting of 8 participants and 10
periods.
9The number over each bar represents the number of observations for each (J,K) case.
10The height of each bar represents the percentage of contributors for each (J,K) case.
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0.077. The bar width represents the relative frequency of (0, 0) for the J = 0 case11; since there
are 63 observations12 for this case, the bar width is 3963 . According to Figure 2.2, for any fixed
J , the frequencies of the K = J + 1 and K = J cases (marked in dark brown) were significantly
larger than those of the other cases. More importantly, each panel displays a substantial decrease
in contributor percentage from the K = J +1 case to the K = J case. According to these findings,
most of the participants were substantially more willing to contribute when J < K than when
J > K, and this contribution behavior did not change when J and K changed—a finding that is
inconsistent with the benchmark model predictions (Figure 2.2, blue line). Individual level data
showing the same results are presented in Appendix A.3.
Models that Fail to Explain the Puzzle. To explain the puzzle presented above, I tested several
relevant theories such as (1) bounded rationality (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), (2) probability
distortion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), (3) risk aversion (Holt and Larury, 2002), and (4)
other-regarding preferences. Theories (1) to (3) have failed to explain the puzzle because they
did not describe a dramatic increase in contribution when participants moved from the situation
where J > K to the situation where J < K.13 For other-regarding preferences, the literature had
yielded a number of models with different specifications, and most of them follow the main idea of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that people are self-centered inequity averse. That is, people only
care about their own monetary payoff relative to the payoff of others (e.g., Charness and Rabin,
2002; Cappelen et al., 2007; Cox et al., 2007; Mago et al., 2013; see Cooper and Kagel 2013 for an
overview). I tested two types of models in this category: the fairness model and the relative payoff
maximization model.
For the fairness model, I considered the strict egalitarian model, the libertarian model, and
the liberal egalitarian model in Cappelen et al. (2007). The predictions of these model are not
consistent with the experimental data. The reason is the following: if people care about fairness,
they should contribute when more of their group and competing group members contribute because
they dislike taking advantage of others, and they should not contribute when less of their group
and competing group members contribute because they dislike that other people take advantage of
11The width of each bar represents the relative frequency of each (J,K) case given a fixed J .
1239 + 11 + 7 + 1 + 5 = 63
13For each of the theories, I used the maximum likelihood method to estimate its parameters with the experimental
data, but the estimates could not be identified.
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them as well. For the relative payoff maximization model, I considered the pro-social model and
the status-seeking model in Mago, Samak, and Sheremeta (2013). The predictions of these model
are still not consistent with the experimental data because: if people (pro-social individuals) strive
to increase the payoff of the entire organization (i.e., their own group and the competing group),
they should always contribute, and if people (status-seeking individuals) strive to obtain a higher
relative payoff within the entire organization, they should never contribute. As discussed above,
these self-centered inequity aversion models did not capture the dramatic increase in contribution
from J > K cases to J < K cases.
Model Incorporating the Effect of Group Envy. Although the self-centered inequity aversion
models seem to fail to explain the puzzle, the idea that people are inequity averse may still work
to explain my experimental data if we consider a group-centered inequity aversion model.
According to the theory of equity in psychology proposed by Adams (1963), inequity exists not
only at the individual level but also at the group level as well.14 Further, evidence for people caring
about inequity at the group level has been found in the laboratory-based studies. For example,
Halevy, Bornstein, and Sagiv (2008), Halevy et al. (2010), and Halevy, Weisel, and Bornstein
(2012) (hereafter referred to as HHH ) perform a series of experiments to investigate inter-team
competition. They find that participants did not contribute to their team when their team was in
the lead, but participants sacrificed their own benefits and contributed to their team when their
team was falling behind, implying that people are group-centered inequity averse in inter-team
competition.
Mui (1995) applies Adams (1963)’s theory to the standard economic choice framework. The
main idea is that people compare their economic status and suffer utility losses when they are in an
unfavorable position. For two agents (groups) engaging in independent productivities, Mui (1995)
proposes a model in which the relative status of an agent (group) is determined by this agent’s
(group’s) output, and the agent (group) with lower output suffers utility losses due to the relatively
low status, causing this agent to take actions either to increase her (its) output or to decrease the
output of the other agent (group). People suffering utility losses from the relatively low status is
characterized as envy.
14Adams (1963) has proposed a theory of equity in psychology: “Inequity exists for Person whenever his perceived
job inputs and/or outcomes stand psychologically in an obverse relation to what he perceives are the inputs and/or
outcomes of Other” and “Person and Other may also refer to groups rather than to individuals” (p.424).
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Based on the theoretical model of Mui (1995) and the experimental findings from HHH, I
therefore consider the effect of envy at the inter-group level by assuming that participants who
believed their team had lower output experienced envy. Further, I incorporate this envy effect
into the benchmark model described in Section 2.2; from this point forward I will refer to this as
the “group envy model”. This group envy model can be viewed as an application of Mui (1995)’s
model at the group level. Assume n participants in team h, h = A,B and their contributions are
given by (xh1 , ..., x
h
n). Therefore, the expected output of team h is E
(
yh
)
=
∑n
i=1 x
h
i . The utility
of participant i on team A is thus defined as
UAi = π
A
i − γimax


∑
k∈B
xBk −

xAi + ∑
j∈A,j 6=i
xAj

 , 0

 , (2.5)
where πAi denotes i’s material payoff (presented in equation (2.4)). The γi parameter measures
i’s utility loss when the expected output of i’s team is less than that of i’s competing team; this
indicates i’s utility loss from relatively low status. Also following Mui (1995), I assumed that γi > 0
for all i. For simplicity, I assumed that γi = γ for all i, and thus was able to derive symmetric
equilibria from equation (2.5).
Proposition 2 Let Nh denote the number of contributors on team h, h ∈ {A,B}.
(a) The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the equilibrium N∗A = N
∗
B = 0 is
g
n
6 2n
n+1 , which is the same as in Proposition 1(a).
(b) The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the equilibrium N∗A = N
∗
B = n is
g
n
>
2n(1−γ)
3n−1 . Given that γ > 0, for any n > 0, a smaller g can achieve this equilibrium when
compared with that described in Proposition 1(b).
(c) For i as a member of team A, in the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium, all workers contribute
with probability p ∈ (0, 1) given by:
nX
NB=0
n−1X
NA=0
pNA+NB (1− p)2n−1−NA−NB
“n− 1
NA
”“ n
NB
”»„1
2
+
1 +NA −NB
2n
«
g
n
(1 + NA + NB)− γmax {NB −NA − 1, 0}
–
= 1 +
nX
NB=0
n−1X
NA=0
pNA+NB (1− p)2n−1−NA−NB
“n− 1
NA
”“ n
NB
”»„1
2
+
NA −NB
2n
«
g
n
(NA +NB)− γ max {NB −NA, 0}
–
.
Proof : See Appendix A.2.
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Estimation. According to proposition 2, the equilibrium contribution level or probability depends
on the value of the γ parameter. Since the data regarding participants contribution decisions and
their beliefs about the number of contributors on their own team (denoted as J) and that on the
competing team (denoted as K) were collected in the experiment, the γ parameter can be estimated
using a maximum likelihood method. To allow a small amount of bounded rationality, I followed
individual choice behavior research (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1973; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995)
to consider a probabilistic choice function with a noise parameter λ to capture the sensitivity of
choices to expected payoffs. This is expressed as
Pr (choose to contribute) =
eλEU
A
C (γ)
eλEU
A
C (γ) + eλEU
A
F (γ)
, (2.6)
where EUAC (γ) and EU
A
F (γ) are calculated by equation (2.5), respectively representing a team A
member i’s expected payoff of contributing and not contributing (i.e., free-riding). Details for
equation (2.6) are given in Appendix A.4.
Using the participants’ contribution decision and belief data, I obtained maximum-likelihood
parameter estimates (and standard errors) for this group envy utility function: γ = 0.43 (0.0012),
and λ = 4.99 (0.0201), with a log-likelihood of −447.306.15 These parameter values were used
to plot the predicted contribution probabilities for different (J,K) cases shown in Figure 2.3. As
shown, there were good fits between the theoretical predictions (red lines) and most of the actual
data (brown bars). It is noteworthy that γ captures the increase of the pattern in each panel.
If only the noise parameter λ was taken into account, the predictions (green lines) and the data
(brown bars) are still inconsistent. Furthermore, substituting γ = 0.43 into Proposition 2.(c) yields
a contribution probability of 0.474, which is much closer to the average data percentage of 0.55
than the benchmark model prediction. Details for the likelihood function are given in Appendix
A.4.
Quantal Response Equilibrium. The logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of this group
envy model can also be calculated using the same parameter values as given in the preceding sec-
tion. Given γ = 0.43 and λ = 4.99, the QRE contribution probability is 0.568 (see Appendix A.4
15In Appendix A.3, I have shown that there were some participants who did not show a significant difference in
contribution between when J < K and when J > K. If we remove the data from those participants, the estimates
(and standard errors) are γ = 0.4414 (0.0014), and λ = 5.764 (0.0261), with a log-likelihood of −338.088.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of contributors in each case: data versus predictions
Note: Data [bars], predictions [green lines] with noise, for the standard utility function with noise = 0.16, and
predictions [red lines] with noise, for the “group-envy” utility function with γ = 0.43 and noise = 4.99.
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Figure 2.5: Data frequencies (brown bars) versus QRE frequencies (red bars)
Note: (x, y) represent the numbers of contributors on two teams such that x 6 y, where x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
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for details). The QRE prediction and experimental data are displayed as Figure 2.4; shown are the
average contribution percentages, average belief about contributions from one’s own team, and av-
erage belief about contributions from a competing team per period across 10 periods. As indicated,
the belief and contribution percentages are very close, with a good fit with the QRE prediction.
To further examine the group envy model performance, I compared the QRE predictions with the
frequencies of different contribution outcomes. Let (x, y) denote the numbers of contributors from
two teams, such that x 6 y and x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Recall that Table 2.3 presents frequency data
for each (x, y) outcome in the experiment. The theoretical frequency of each (x, y) outcome was
calculated at a QRE contribution probability of 0.568. As shown in Figure 2.5, the theoretical fre-
quencies (red bars) fit well with most of the data frequencies (brown bars) that have been presented
in Table 2.3. Result 2 summarizes the findings.
Result 2. Participants significantly contributed more when they believed that their team had lower
ouput, and this behavior was consistent with the prediction of the model after taking into consider-
ation the effect of group envy produced by participants who believed their team had lower output.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper presents an experimental examination of how incentives can be provided to groups that
produce joint products (e.g., divisions in a firm). Previous researchers have focused on profit-sharing
schemes or tournaments schemes with exogenously determined prizes. In practice, for example when
teams within a firm compete, the size of the prize is itself endogenous and depends upon aggregate
output of the entire firm, so I focus on that case. For the present study I proposed a tournament-
based scheme in which a firm creates an environment for team competition, while awarding prizes
that depend on the firm’s aggregate output: workers on the winning team receive payoffs depending
on tokens contributed by its members to a common account plus similarly contributed tokens in
an account held by the losing team, while workers on the losing team receive nothing from their
own team account.
There are two main findings from my experiment. First, compared to a simple profit-sharing
scheme, the proposed team tournament mechanism encouraged participants to make a larger num-
ber of contributions, and contribution percentages remained constant when the team tournament
25
mechanism was used, while the percentage of contributions decreased over time when the simple
profit-sharing scheme was used. These findings support the hypothesis that creating competition
mitigates the potential for a free-rider problem.
However, even though the results support the hypothesis, data for the team tournament mech-
anism are not consistent with the benchmark model predictions (which only considers monetary
payoffs) presented in Section 2—for example, average percentage of contributions (Figure 4.6),
tournament outcome frequencies (Table 2.3), and contribution responses to beliefs about other
individuals’ contribution decisions (Figure 2.2). To resolve these inconsistencies, I applied Mui
(1995)’s envy model from individual levels to group levels by incorporating the effect of envy pro-
duced by participants who believed their team had lower output into the benchmark model. After
taking this effect into consideration, a good fit was found between the model and the experimental
data (Figures 2.3-2.5), which is the second main finding from my experiment.
Discussion and Future Work. An obvious question from my second main finding is whether
this effect also emerges from inter-team competitions with other kinds of prize structures. To
discuss this question, it is very important to note that relative deprivation is the fundamental
“aggravating condition” underlying group envy (Halevy et al. (2010), p. 695)16. According to
relative deprivation theory, feelings of anger and resentment arise when individuals want something
they feel entitled to and when they perceive another person having that thing (Halevy et al. (2010)).
The key phrase here is “think they are entitled to.” Recall that individuals on the winning team in
the TT treatment group received tokens from commonly held team account plus tokens from the
commonly held account of the losing team. It is reasonable to assume that losing team members
felt entitled to the tokens they contributed to their own team’s account, thus creating a situation
of perceived deprivation when those tokens were taken away and given to members of the winning
team. However, most studies on inter-team competition use exogenous prizes in which amounts
are independent of the contributions made by the winning and losing teams. In such settings,
members of both teams get to keep the proceed of their respective accounts, with members of the
winning team receiving bonuses. Therefore, these scenarios should not be considered examples of
deprivation leading to high levels of group envy. The relationship between emergence of group envy
16Note that it is called out-group hate rather than group envy in Halevy et al. (2010), but the meanings of these
two terms are exactly the same.
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and competition structures could be tested in future experiments.
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Chapter 3
Getting Out the Vote: Information
and Voting Behavior
3.1 Introduction
Although voter turnout is a core issue in political economy, there is little consensus on how best
to understand it. Arguably the most controversial theory in studying voter turnout is Downs
(1957) rational choice theory, which was initially formulated as a decision theoretic model, and
was modified in order to serve as a pivotal voter model. Pivotal voter models claim that voters
decide whether or not to vote based on their chances of being pivotal; however, the real-world
probability of a single vote being pivotal in a mass election is very low: According to Gelman,
Silver, and Edlin (2012), an American voter had a 1 in 60 million chance of being pivotal in the
2008 presidential election. In other words, pivotal voter models underpredict turnout rates in mass
elections. Nonetheless, pivotal voter models still provide useful guidance. For example, results
from Levine and Palfrey (2007) experimental examination of the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)
pivotal voter model clearly identify and support the three main equilibrium static effects of size,
competition, and “the underdog” in voter participation games.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, pivotal voter models provide useful guidance regarding
how information affects voting behavior (Agranov et al. (2012)). The present paper studies effects
of information on voter turnout in the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model and compares two
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information-revealing mechanisms: one through which active supporters show their support without
paying costs, which can be viewed as cheap talk; the other where active supporters have to pay to
support their preferred candidates, therefore providing more certainty in the form of actual levels
of support for a party than the first mechanism.
Examples for the first mechanism are political polls. Researchers using pivotal voter models
to study the impacts of information have reported higher overall turnout rates when pollsters are
free to inform electorates on information about support levels for individual candidates (especially
compared to scenarios where polls are prohibited), and have found evidence indicating that polls
exert different effects in close versus widely divided elections (Klor and Winter (2006); Grober and
Schram (2010); Agranov et al. (2012)). For convenience, I will call the first mechanism polls in the
rest of the paper.
Examples for the second mechanism are political endorsement, Super PACs, and party cam-
paigns, where supporters need to pay their money (e.g., contributing to Super PACs) or time
(participating in campaign activities) to show their support. Ralph Nader organized a series of
campaign rallies in an attempt to get his supporters to the polls so as to achieve the minimum 5%
vote to secure public campaign financing for his Green Party in 2004. The purpose of the rallies
was to convince voters that he was capable of achieving that percentage (Morton (2006)). Another
example is the 2004 presidential campaign in Taiwan, which Mattlin (2004) describes as a “virtual
arms race of mass rallies” (p. 167). To support the Chen Shui-bian campaign, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) organized a human chain around a
theme of ”protecting Taiwan.” An estimated 2 million people took part in the chain, which ran 486
kilometers from the island’s northernmost point to its southern tip. According to Clark (2004),
“The huge turnout certainly proved the rally to be a tremendous success in igniting Pan-Green
[multiple parties with similar platforms] supporters” (p. 32). These kinds of activities are based
on the core belief that a political party can mobilize its supporters by proving to them that there
is strong support for their candidate or referendum, thereby convincing them that victory is likely
if they make the effort to vote. For convenience, I will call the second mechanism campaigns in the
rest of the paper.
From the examples of the two mechanisms, we see that while both campaigns and polls can
indicate support for parties, the campaigns provide more certainty in the form of actual levels
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of support; the polls are more likely to reveal distributions of electorate preferences. There are
some papers studying the effects of information revealed through polls (Klor and Winter (2006);
Grober and Schram (2010); Agranov et al. (2012)); however, from my review of the literature it
appears that economists and political scientists pay little attention to the campaigns in terms of
its information effects described above. Therefore, the current paper focuses on (1) the impacts of
information revealed through campaigns on voter turnout and (2) the comparison of turnout in a
campaign environment with a poll environment.
In this paper I will consider a two-party election, with each party consisting of two types of
voters: active partisans (those who always vote for their preferred party) and passive partisans
(those who either vote for their preferred party or abstain). Since active partisans always turn out
to vote, in the following, “turnout” refers to turnout of passive partisans. It is assumed that there is
a πi probability that an i party has a large number of active partisans and a 1−πi probability that
this i party has a small number of active partisans. The probability πi is prior information, and the
actual number of the active partisans can be revealed only by campaigns. To capture differences
in effects of revealing information between campaigns and polls, the model used in this study was
based on the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model and was designed so that in the absence of
campaigns, voters know the probability of a large number of active partisans for each party (π1 and
π2), but do not know the actual active partisan number, which represents poll effects. According
to pivotal voter models, a strategic voter decides whether or not to vote based on voting costs and
the probability of casting a pivotal vote in an election. Similar to the pivotal voter models, each
passive partisan (i.e., strategic voter) in the proposed model decides whether or not to vote based
on voting costs and what is learned from either campaigns or polls.
To analyze the impacts of campaigns on voter turnout, three comparative static effects based
on Levine and Palfrey (2007) are considered: (a) size: holding the relative numbers of base parti-
sans for two parties constant, turnout decreases as the number of passive partisans increases; (b)
competition: given the equal sizes of two parties, turnout for each party is higher in situations
where they have similar numbers of active partisans; (c) underdog : given the equal sizes of two
parties, the turnout for the party with a smaller bloc of active partisans will be exceed the turnout
of the party with a larger bloc of active partisans. Further, differences between campaigns and
polls are analyzed according to the prediction that if two parties have similar numbers of active
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partisans, passive partisans in each party will be more likely to vote when both parties organize
and execute campaign activities than when only one party does so. If the two parties have very
different numbers of active partisans, the opposite result is likely to occur. In this study this is
referred to as the information-revealing effect of campaigns.
I performed an array of experiments to examine the hypotheses presented above. There are
two main findings. First, in most of the situations, subjects followed the main ideas of the Palfrey-
Rosenthal pivotal voter model, with appropriately responding to the cost of voting and the belief of
being pivotal. Second, however, when subjects were informed of being in an advantageous position
by campaigns, their turnout became significantly higher than the best response to their belief of
being pivotal. This can be attributed to that leading in an interim stage has a positive psychological
impact on performance in tournaments. On the other hand, compared with campaigns, it is more
difficult for polls to cause the same effect. In addition to these two findings, subjects incorrectly
estimated their beliefs of being pivotal when being in the treatment where the parties used different
information-revealing mechanisms, while they seemed to not have this problem when being in the
treatment where the parties used the same information-revealing mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will describe a model, based
on the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model, that shows how the information regarding active
partisans revealed through campaigns and polls affects voter turnout. The experimental design
and hypotheses for the study are introduced in Section 3, and experimental results are presented
in Section 4. The last section concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Two-party Race
The model used in this study is based on the turnout model developed and refined by Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1985) and Levine and Palfrey (2007), in which voters are described as having and
reacting to privately known voting costs, which more accurately reflect real world characteristics.
There are two parties, T1 and T2, with N1 voters in T1 and N2 voters in T2. Since real-world parties
always aim their mobilization efforts at partisan voters Holbrook and McClurg (2005), the proposed
model does not consider independent voters—in other words, voters belong to T1 choose either to
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vote for T1 or to abstain and voters belong to T2 choose either to vote for T2 or to abstain. Voters are
categorized as either active partisans or passive partisans. It is assumed that active partisans have
zero voting costs, therefore voting can be considered a dominant strategy. Accordingly, a party’s
active partisans can be viewed as this party’s support base. Voting costs for passive partisan j are
denoted as cj and set at a value greater than zero for any j. Further, cj is independently drawn
from a common density function f(c) and is privately known by j before j decides whether or not
to vote. The sizes of N1 and N2 and the density function of the cost distribution f(c) are common
knowledge; f(c) is assumed to be positive everywhere on its support.
There is a probability π1 that T1 has a large number of active partisans (represented by R1L)
and a probability 1− π1 that T1 has a small number of active partisans (represented by R1S). The
respective large and small numbers of active partisans for T2 are represented by R2L (probability
π2) and R2S (probability 1−π2). The π1 and π2 probabilities are independent and commonly known
by all, representing information revealed by polls. According to this setting, the active partisan
numbers for the two parties are random variables. If Ti organizes campaign activities, each voter
will learn the actual number of that party’s active partisans (i.e., either RiL or RiS); otherwise,
each voter must rely on poll data (i.e., πi).
Passive partisan j decides whether or not to vote for her party based on what she learns from
campaign activities or polls. Recall that she must incur voting cost cj in order to cast her vote. If
T1 wins, all T1 partisans receive reward H and all T2 partisans receive reward L < H; the opposite
occurs if T2 wins. These rewards are common knowledge. In this study it is assumed that all passive
partisans in the same party use the same decision rule in equilibrium. According to Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985), a quasi-symmetric voting equilibrium consists of a pair of critical points (cˆ1, cˆ2)
such that any passive partisan j in T1 votes if and only if cj < cˆ1, and any passive partisan j in
T2 votes if and only if cA < cˆ2. A quasi-symmetric equilibrium implies a (pˆ1, pˆ2) aggregate voting
probability for passive partisans in each party given by
pˆ1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
f(c)dc = F (cˆ1) (3.1)
pˆ2 =
∫ cˆ2
0
f(c)dc = F (cˆ2). (3.2)
Since (cˆ1, cˆ2) is an equilibrium, for any interior solution a passive partisan with a voting cost equal
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to (cˆ1, cˆ2) must feel indifferent about voting or abstaining. As a result,
cˆ1 =
H − L
2
qˆ1 (3.3)
cˆ2 =
H − L
2
qˆ2 (3.4)
where qˆ1 (qˆ2) is the probability that a vote cast by a passive partisan in T1 (T2) will be pivotal in
making or breaking a tie given the equilibrium voting strategies of all other voters in both parties.
The proposed model considers three types of situations: both parties conduct campaign ac-
tivities, only one party does, and neither party does. The primary study parameter is how much
information passive partisans have about the numbers of active partisans in the two parties. Let
R1 and R2 represent the realized numbers of T1 and T2 active partisans, respectively. In the first
situation described above, Ri ∈ {RiL, RiS} where i ∈ {1, 2}; in the second, if one party (T1) refrains
from campaign activities, R1 is defined as an empty set (i.e., R1 = ∅) and R2 ∈ {R2L, R2S}; in the
third, R1 = R2 = ∅. The equilibrium values of (cˆ1, cˆ2), (pˆ1, pˆ2), and (qˆ1, qˆ2) depend on the actions
of the two parties, (π1, π2), (R1L, R1S) and (R2L, R2S). In the following sections, I will characterize
voter turnout equilibria under different situations.
Voter Turnout Equilibria
Both parties conduct campaign activities. The probability that k passive partisans turn out
to vote when there are n passive partisans and each passive partisan has a probability p of voting
is denoted as Pp(k|p, n). Note that p is not well-defined when n = 0 because there are no passive
partisans. In such cases, Pp(k|p, n) = 1 and
∑
k Pp(k|p, n) = 1, which ensures that the formulas in
Section 2 are well-defined. Let (c∗1, c
∗
2), (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) and (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) denote the equilibrium values of (cˆ1, cˆ2),
(pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2) respectively. If both parties conduct campaign activities, all individuals will
have precise knowledge of the numbers of active partisans in each of the two parties (R1 and R2).
Given R1 and R2, the probability of a passive partisan in party T1 or T2 making or breaking an
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election is expressed as
q∗1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=max{R1,R2}
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1 − 1) · Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=r1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1 − 1) · Pp(k + 1−R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
(3.5)
q∗2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=max{R1,R2}
{
Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2 − 1) · Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=r2
{
Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2 − 1) · Pp(k + 1−R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1)
}
(3.6)
where ri = max{R1, R2} − 1 if Ri < Rj , otherwise ri = max{R1, R2}. Equations (4.1)-(4.4), (C.1)
and (C.2), can be used to solve (c∗1, c
∗
2), (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) and (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2).
Neither party conducts campaign activities. In this scenario, individuals in the two parties
are limited in their knowledge to the probabilities of large numbers of active partisans in their own
and the other party (π1 and π2). Assume n voters, with rL active partisans with probability π and
rS active partisans with probability 1− π, and with each passive partisan having probability p of
voting in an election. The probability of a precise k number of voters casting their ballots can be
expressed as
PN (k|p, π, n, rL, rS) = π · Pp(k − rL|p, n − rL) + (1− π) · Pp(k − rS |p, n− rS).
Given that T1 has R1L active partisans with probability π1 and R1S active partisans with probability
1 − π1, and that T2 has R2L active partisans with probability π2 and R2S active partisans with
probability 1− π2, equations (C.1) and (C.2) become
q˜1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=0
{
PN (k|p˜1, π1, N1 − 1, R1L, R1S) · PN (k|p˜2, π2, N2, R2L, R2S)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
PN (k|p˜1, π1, N1 − 1, R1L, R1S) · PN (k + 1|p˜2, π2, N2, R2L, R2S)
}
(3.7)
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q˜2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
PN (k|p˜2, π2, N2 − 1, R2L, R2S) · PN (k|p˜1, π1, N1, R1L, R1S)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
PN (k|p˜2, π2, N2 − 1, R2L, R2S) · PN (k + 1|p˜1, π1, N1, R1L, R1S)
}
(3.8)
where (p˜1, p˜2) and (q˜1, q˜2) are the equilibrium values of (pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2) respectively.
Only one party conducts campaign activities. In this scenario, individuals know the precise
number of active partisans in the party that conducts campaign activities. For the party that
doesn’t conduct campaign activities, individuals are limited to knowing the probability of this
party’s support base. With no loss of generality, assume that T1 conducts campaign activities and
T2 does not. Then, individuals know the actual value of R1 (i.e., R1 = R1L or R1 = R1S) but they
don’t know the actual value of R2; they only know that there is a probability π2 that R2 = R2L
and a probability 1− π2 that R2 = R2S . Given π2 and R1, equations (C.1) and (C.2) become
q∗∗1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1 − 1) · PN (k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2, R2L, R2S)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1 − 1) · PN (k + 1|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2, R2L, R2S)
}
(3.9)
q∗∗2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=R1
{
PN (k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2 − 1, R2L, R2S) · Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=max{R1−1,0}
{
PN (k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2 − 1, R2L, R2S) · Pp(k + 1−R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1)
}
(3.10)
where (p∗∗1 , p
∗∗
2 ) and (q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) respectively represent the (pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2) equilibrium values.
3.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
3.3.1 Experimental Design
All parameters described in the preceding section were controlled for. Following the lead of Levine
and Palfrey (2007), payoffs were established at L = 1 and H = 21, and voting cost distribution f
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was uniform, ranging from 0 to 11. Experiment parameters were set as N1 = N2 = 4, π1 = 0.6,
π2 = 0.4, R1L = R2L = 3, and R1S = R2S = 1. I offer two reasons for these parameters. First, the
purpose of this paper is to investigate the impacts of information using a pivotal model in which
turnout is affected by voter belief in being/not being pivotal, and therefore there are advantages
to using an environment in which voters have correct beliefs, and such an environment is easier
to achieve when the voter pool is small. Second, one goal of this study is to compare differences
between campaigns and polls. Since campaigns identify actual levels of support while polls only
identify the probabilities of support bases, a large variance of the actual sizes of support bases (i.e.,
RiL = 3, RiS = 1) is more helpful for identifying the different impacts of campaign activities and
polls.
The experiment consisted of four treatments designed to examine voter response to information
revealed by campaign activities and polls. The two primary roles were active and passive partisan.
Human subjects played the role of passive partisans deciding whether or not to vote, while client
computers played the role of active partisans who always voted. Further, the experiment was
divided into two types of groups, an A group representing the T1 party and a B group representing
the T2 party, leading to NA = NB = 4, πA = 0.6, πB = 0.4, RAL = RBL = 3, and RAS = RBS = 1.
More specifically, each group had 4 members: for the A groups, there was a 0.6 probability of
having 3 active partisans and a 0.4 probability of having 1 active partisan; for the B group, there
was a 0.4 probability of having 3 active partisans and a 0.6 probability of having 1 active partisan.
Each experimental session consisted of 40 periods, with the timing for each period established as
follows:
States and Partisanship. Here there were equal numbers of A and B groups. At the start of
each period, all A and B groups were randomly paired, with each subject randomly assigned to
an A or B group; in addition, the server computer randomly determined the numbers of active
partisans of the A and B groups. Note that in each period, all A groups had the same number of
active partisans, and all B groups had the same number of active partisans. If in one period the
server computer determined that each A group had 1 active partisan, then each A group had 1
active partisan and 3 passive partisans in this period. If subject i is assigned to an A group in this
period, than subject i and 2 other subjects served as the A group passive partisans in this period.
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As mentioned earlier, client computers played the role of active partisans.
Campaigns or Polls. Depending on the treatment, subjects were provided with different infor-
mation on the numbers of active partisans in the A and B groups. The four treatments were:
The CC treatment : Subjects were informed of the actual numbers of active partisans in the A
and B groups. This treatment represents the situation in which both parties conduct campaign
activities.
The CP treatment : Subjects were told the actual number of active partisans in the A groups but
not told that number in the B groups, even though it had been determined. Subject knowledge
was limited to a 0.4 probability of the B groups having 3 active partisans and a 0.6 probability of
the B groups having 1 active partisan.
The PC treatment : This was similar to the CP treatment, except that subjects were only informed
of the probabilities of support bases for the A groups while learning the actual number of active
partisans of the B groups. Combined, PC and CP treatments represent the situation where one
party conducts campaigns but the other does not.
The PP treatment : Subjects were only informed of the probabilities of support bases for the A
and B groups. This treatment represents the situation where neither party conducts campaign
activities.
Voting Decisions and Beliefs. After receiving information regarding active partisans, subjects
decided whether or not to vote for their respective parties. Voting entailed a cost that was inde-
pendently drawn from the uniform distribution and was known by each subject individually. Every
attempt was made to use neutral language in the experiment instructions. Accordingly, I followed
Levine and Palfrey (2007) to let subjects choose between “X” (casting a vote) and “Y” (abstaining).
In terms of voting costs, a subject who chose Y was given a “Y bonus” that was added to that
subject’s earning, while a subject choosing X did not receive a “Y bonus,” thereby treating voting
costs as opportunity costs. Y bonuses were randomly redrawn (independently for each subject)
from the uniform distribution between 0 and 11, in integer increments, for each period; subjects
were only informed of their own Y bonuses. After making their voting decisions, subjects was
asked to make guesses as to the probabilities of their votes being pivotal and about other subjects’
decisions. The data on the other subjects’ decisions were used to examine beliefs regarding whether
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or not their voting decisions were pivotal.
Payoffs. Each group’s votes were counted once all decision and guess data were gathered. Recall
that there were several pairs of A and B groups. In each pair, the group receiving the majority of
votes won, and each subject in that group received 21 points; subjects in the other group received
1 point each. In cases of ties, each subject received 11 points. Subjects were paid based on the
accuracy of their guesses—a bonus of 1 point for guessing the pivotal probability according to Karni
(2009) method, and an additional bonus of 1 point for correctly guessing decisions made by their
subject counterparts.
3.3.2 Hypotheses
For the study hypotheses, recall that all A groups were identical, as were all B groups, and that
each A group was randomly paired with a B group. In each pair, the actual numbers of the active
partisans in the A and B groups are denoted by RA and RB, respectively; the probabilities of large
numbers of active partisans in the A and B groups are denoted by πA and πB, respectively. In each
pair, the turnout rate for the A group as a function of the information on the actual numbers of
active partisans of the A and B groups is denoted as p∗A(RA, RB) for the CC, p
∗
A(RA, πB) for the
CP , p∗A(πA, RB) for the PC, and p
∗
A(πA, πB) for the PP treatment; similarly, the turnout rate for
the B group is denoted as p∗B. The Nash equilibrium turnout probabilities for the A and B groups
according to each treatment are shown in Table 3.1. Equilibrium is unique for all my treatments.1
I initially focused on the CC treatment group to study the impacts of campaign-revealed in-
formation on voting behavior. Following the lead of Levine and Palfrey (2007), three hypotheses
were established for this treatment. The predictions for these hypotheses are consistent with those
of Levine and Palfrey’s (2007) first three hypotheses.
H1: Size Effect. For each pair of A and B groups, holding the relative numbers of their active
partisans constant, turnout in each group decreases as the number of passive (active) partisans
increases (decreases). That is, p∗A(1, 1) < p
∗
A(3, 3) and p
∗
B(1, 1) < p
∗
B(3, 3).
H2: Competition Effect. For each pair of A and B groups, turnout is higher when the two groups
have close support bases. That is, p∗s(r, r) > p
∗
s(r, rˆ) and p
∗
s(r, r) > p
∗
s(rˆ, r), where s ∈ {A,B},
1I used numerical grid searches to show that only one equilibrium existed for each treatment.
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Table 3.1: Experimental Design and Predictions
Treatment NA NB RA or πA RB or πB p
∗
A p
∗
B
CC 4 4 1 1 0.573 0.573
4 4 3 1 0.407 0.465
4 4 1 3 0.465 0.407
4 4 3 3 0.909 0.909
CP 4 4 1 0.4 0.525 0.537
4 4 3 0.4 0.762 0.659
PC 4 4 0.6 1 0.500 0.500
4 4 0.6 3 0.787 0.867
PP 4 4 0.6 0.4 0.694 0.661
r ∈ {1, 3}, rˆ ∈ {1, 3}, and r 6= rˆ.
H3: Underdog Effect. In each pair of A andB groups, , turnout of the group with a weak support
base is greater than turnout of the group with a strong support base. That is, p∗A(1, 3) > p
∗
B(1, 3)
and p∗B(3, 1) > p
∗
A(3, 1).
Next, I investigated differences in the information-revealing effects of polls and campaigns on
voter turnout by comparing CC and PC treatments for A groups and comparing CC and CP
treatments for B groups.
H4: Information-Revealing Effect. Both campaigns and polls are capable of revealing the
information on a party’s support base, but campaign activities provide greater certainty of its level
than polls, thus providing greater certainty of an election outcome than polls, resulting in a higher
or lower propensity to cast a vote.
Specifically, in any A and B group pair, given that one group (for this example, the B group)
conducts campaign activities, passive partisans in both groups will have a greater propensity to
vote if the A group also conducts campaign activities and reveals the same number of active
partisans as the B group than if the A group does not conduct campaign activities and limits the
information about its active partisans to polls. In brief, p∗s(r, r) > p
∗
s(πA, r), p
∗
s(r, r) > p
∗
s(r, πB),
where s ∈ {A,B} and r ∈ {1, 3}. The reason is that in this case campaign activities are much
more likely to reveal the closeness of an election, causing each passive partisan to perceive a high
probability of holding a pivotal vote.
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On the other hand, in any pair of A and B groups, given that one group (again I will use the
B group here) conducts campaign activities, if the A group also conducts campaign activities but
reveals a larger or smaller number of active partisans, there will be lower propensities for either
A or B group passive partisans to vote than if the A group does not conduct campaign activities.
That is, p∗s(r, rˆ) < p
∗
s(πA, rˆ), and p
∗
s(r, rˆ) < p
∗
s(r, πB), where s ∈ {A,B}, r ∈ {1, 3}, rˆ ∈ {1, 3}, and
r 6= rˆ.
3.3.3 Experimental Protocol
A total of 15 experimental sessions were held in the Missouri Social Science Experimental Lab-
oratory (MISSEL) of Washington University in St. Louis, 8 in the winter of 2012 and 7 in the
spring of 2013. Each session lasted approximately 2.5 hours. A total of 112 study subjects were
recruited through the MISSEL subject pool. Of these, 28 were randomly assigned to one of the four
treatment groups, with each participating in only one session. Subjects were paid $5 for showing
up on time and listening to the instructions, which varied for each treatment, after which they
were requested to respond to control questions. Students interacted via a computer network in the
laboratory, with work station partitions ensuring anonymity. Experiments were conducted using
Fischbacher (2007a) the z-Tree program. Subjects earned an average of $35, including the show-up
fee. The point-to-dollar exchange rate was 25:1.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Aggregate Results
I first analyze the experimental results at the aggregate level. Before the analysis, two things need
to be mentioned. First, for each treatment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two or one
of four situations of that treatment. For convenience, in the following, I will use an abbreviation
to represent each of these situations (Table 3.2). Second, for the CC treatment, experimental data
from A and B groups were combined for each situation since the A and B groups were identical in
each situation of the CC treatment.2
2In other words, pˆA(1, 1) = pˆB(1, 1) and pˆA(1, 1) = pˆB(1, 1) in CCTie1 ; pˆA(3, 3) = pˆB(3, 3) and pˆA(3, 3) = pˆB(3, 3)
in CCTie3 ; pˆA(1, 3) = pˆB(3, 1) and pˆA(1, 3) = pˆB(3, 1) in CCMinority ; pˆA(3, 1) = pˆB(1, 3) and pˆA(3, 1) = pˆB(1, 3) in
CCMajority.
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Table 3.2: Abbreviation of Each Case of Each Treatment
Case Situation Position
RA;piA RB ;piB Alpha Beta Alpha Beta
CC 1 1 CCTie1 CCTie1 - -
3 1 CCMajority CCMinority advantageous disadvantageous
1 3 CCMinority CCMajority disadvantageous advantageous
3 3 CCTie3 CCTie3 - -
CP 1 0.4 CPMinority CPFaceMinority disadvantageous advantageous
3 0.4 CPMajority CPFaceMajority advantageous disadvantageous
PC 0.6 1 PCFaceMinority PCMinority advantageous disadvantageous
0.6 3 PCFaceMajority PCMajority disadvantageous advantageous
PP 0.6 0.4 PPMajority PPMinority advantageous disadvantageous
Table 3.3: Turnout Rates–Comparison of Theory and Data
No. of
Subjects RA;πA RB;πB p
∗
A
pˆA ˆˆpA p
∗
B
pˆB ˆˆpB
CC 26 1 1 0.573 0.635 0.647 - - -
3 1 0.407 0.659 0.473 0.465 0.402 0.420
1 3 0.465 0.402 0.420 0.407 0.659 0.473
3 3 0.909 0.870 0.802 - - -
CP 28 1 0.4 0.525 0.554 0.569 0.537 0.677 0.618
3 0.4 0.762 0.794 0.606 0.659 0.533 0.529
PC 30 0.6 1 0.500 0.661 0.625 0.500 0.634 0.612
0.6 3 0.787 0.609 0.662 0.867 0.746 0.716
PP 28 0.6 0.4 0.694 0.735 0.680 0.661 0.692 0.665
Table 3.3 displays for each group and each treatment the Nash equilibrium turnout rates (de-
noted p∗) and the observed turnout rates (denoted pˆ).3 To test the relationship between pˆ and
p∗, I used subjects’ average turnout rates for each situation of each treatment as an observation to
conduct Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Since each subject only participated in one situation for around
10 periods, the sample size is not that large; I, therefore, performed my tests at the 0.01 critical
level. According to the tests, I found that pˆ is significantly different from p∗, with p-value be-
low 0.01, in the following situations: CCMajority, CPFaceMinority, CPFaceMajority, PCMinority,
3Columns 5 and 8 for ˆˆp will be discussed later.
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PCFaceMinority, and PCFaceMajority (Finding 1).
Then, I used the same observations4 to conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the hypotheses
of the size (H1), the competition (H2), and the underdog effects (H3) and to conduct Wilcoxon
rank sum tests for the hypothesis of the information-revealing effect (H4). H1 is supported by the
data. H2 is supported with the exception of the comparison of turnout in CCTie1 and CCMajority
since turnout in CCMajority is significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction.5 For H3,
instead of being supported, the data show the opposite: the turnout in CCMajority is significantly
greater than that in CCMinority, implying that subjects were more likely to vote when they were
frontrunners than when they were underdogs. This result is consistent with Duffy and Tavits (2008),
Grober and Schram (2010), and Agranov et al. (2012). For H4, about half of the comparison
of turnout is not supported by the data.6 This is because turnout in each of the CCMajority,
CPFaceMinority or PCFaceMinority is higher than the corresponding Nash equilibrium prediction.
Result 1 summarizes the discussions above.
Result 1. The observed turnout rates were significantly different from the Nash equilibrium turnout
rates in about half of the situations. Among them, the unpredictably high turnout in CCMajority
causes the failure of support for the hypotheses about the competition effect and the underdog effect,
and the unpredictably high turnout in CCMajority, CPFaceMinority, and PCFaceMinority causes
the failure of support for the hypothesis of the information-revealing effect.
There are three possible explanations for Result 1: (1) subjects’ beliefs of being pivotal were
consistent with the Nash equilibrium predictions, but they did not behave as predicted by the pivotal
voter model; (2) subjects’ beliefs of being pivotal were not consistent with the Nash equilibrium
predictions, but they appropriately conditioned their behavior on those beliefs; (3) subjects neither
formed correct pivotality beliefs nor behaved appropriately.
To test if subjects appropriately responded to the probability of being pivotal, I substituted
subjects’ stated pivotality probabilities for equilibrium pivotality probabilities into the proposed
model (i.e., equations (4.1) to (4.4)) to obtain the best-response-to-subjective-belief turnout rates
4That is, I used subjects’ average turnout rates for each situation in each treatment as an observation.
5In that comparison, the null hypothesis pˆA(1, 1) = pˆA(3, 1) (pˆB(1, 1) = pˆB(1, 3)) was not rejected by the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
6Specifically, p∗A(0.6, 3) < p
∗
A(3, 3), p
∗
A(1, 3) < p
∗
A(0.6, 3), p
∗
B(3, 0.4) < p
∗
B(3, 3), and p
∗
B(3, 1) < p
∗
B(3, 0.4) are
supported by the data, but p∗A(0.6, 1) < p
∗
A(1, 1), p
∗
A(3, 1) < p
∗
A(0.6, 1), p
∗
B(1, 0.4) < p
∗
B(1, 1), and p
∗
B(1, 3) < p
∗
B(1, 0.4)
are not supported by the data.
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Table 3.4: Test of Appropriate Behavior (pˆ, ˆˆp) and Test of Pivotality Belief (ˆˆp, p∗)
CCMajority CCMinority CCTie1 CCTie3
Finding 1: Observed turnout & NE pˆ > p∗ - - -
Finding 2: Test of appropriate behavior pˆ > ˆˆp - - pˆ > ˆˆp
Finding 3: Test of pivotality belief - - - -
CPMajority CPMinority CPFaceMajority CPFaceMinority
Finding 1: Observed turnout & NE - - pˆ < p∗ pˆ > p∗
Finding 2: Test of appropriate behavior pˆ > ˆˆp - - -
Finding 3: Test of pivotality belief ˆˆp < p∗ - ˆˆp < p∗ ˆˆp > p∗
PCMajority PCMinority PCFaceMajority PCFaceMinority
Finding 1: Observed turnout & NE - pˆ > p∗ pˆ < p∗ pˆ > p∗
Finding 2: Test of appropriate behavior - - - -
Finding 3: Test of pivotality belief ˆˆp < p∗ ˆˆp > p∗ ˆˆp < p∗ ˆˆp > p∗
PPMajority PPMinority
Finding 1: Observed turnout & NE - -
Finding 2: Test of appropriate behavior - -
Finding 3: Test of pivotality belief - -
“-” represents that the two values are not significantly different at the 0.01 critical level.
(denoted ˆˆp). By using the same test method and the same critical level, I found that pˆ is close to
ˆˆp in every situation except in CCMajority and CPMajority, where pˆ is significantly higher than ˆˆp
(Finding 2).
To test if subjects’ beliefs of being pivotal were consistent with the Nash equilibrium predic-
tions, I tested the relationship between ˆˆp and p∗. By using the average subjects’ stated pivotality
probabilities for each situation of each treatment as an observation to conduct Wilcoxon rank
sum tests, I found that ˆˆp is significantly different from p∗, with p-value below 0.01, in CCTie3,
CPMajority, CPFaceMinority, CPFaceMajority, PCMajority, PCMinority, PCFaceMinority, and
PCFaceMajority (Finding 3).
Table 3.4 summarizes and reports the details for Finding 1, Finding 2, and Finding 3. As can
be seen, the CCMajority subjects and the CPMajority subjects did not behave as predicted by the
pivotal voter model—they were more willing to vote, when compared with the best responses to
their subjective pivotality beliefs (Puzzle 1) On the other hand, except for being in CCMajority or
CPMajority, subjects were appropriately conditioning their behavior on their subjective pivotality
beliefs, but they incorrectly estimated those beliefs when being in the treatments where two parties
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Misclassification Rates
used different information-revealing mechanisms (Puzzle 2)
3.4.2 Individual Results
After examining the data at the aggregate level, I turn to analyze the experimental data at the
individual level. By assuming that each subject was following a cutpoint rule for each situation,
I estimated each subject’s cutpoint rule according to the method in Levine and Palfrey (2007).
With the estimated cutpoints, for each subject, I used his/her estimated cutpoint to calculate the
size of error with respect to that cutpoint.7 Figure 3.1 displays the density for error rates. As
can be seen, around seventy percent of the subjects perfectly classified the decisions based on their
cutpoint rules, and for all subjects the percent of decisions correctly classified is greater than 70%.
This shows that subjects followed consistent cutpoint rules. Then, I tested H1-H4 hypotheses at
the individual level by reproducing Figure 6 and Table 6 of Levine and Palfrey (2007) (See Figure
B.1, Figure B.3, and Table B.1 in the Appendix B.1). Not surprisingly, H2, H3, and H4 are not
supported by the data at the individual level for the same reasons presented in the last section.
Result 2 summarizes the discussion above and the discussion in the last section.
Result 2. Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1 demonstrate that (1) in most of the situations, that the
7See Levine and Palfrey (2007) pp.150-152 for more details.
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Table 3.5: Probit Regressions: CCMajority and CPMajority
Dependent variable: Vote CCMajority CCMajority CPMajority CP Majority
Voting Cost -0.084∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.014)
Period -0.0049∗ -0.0054∗∗ -0.0018 0.0019
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Voted at t-1 0.71∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.304) (0.279) (0.228) (0.221)
Won at t-1 -0.0065 -0.0066 -0.0021 -0.0016
(0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Voted and Won at t-1 -0.0057 -0.0069 -0.00047 -0.00073
(0.010) (0.010) (0.0050) (0.0050)
lead of the majority if in majority -0.13∗∗ -0.078∗∗
(0.062) (0.035)
Belief of being Pivotal -0.33∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.17∗ -0.16∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.095) (0.093)
lead = 0 or -1 (dummy) 0.16∗∗ 0.11∗
(0.066) (0.064)
# of obs. 188 188 263 263
hypotheses are not supported by the experimental data is because subjects’ beliefs of being pivotal were
not consistent with the Nash equilibrium predictions, and is not because subjects’ voting behavior
was inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium prediction; (2) in general, subjects followed the main
ideas of the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model, with appropriately responding to the cost of
voting and the belief of being pivotal.
Explanation for Puzzle 1
To study Puzzle 1 and Puzzle 2, I used regression analysis to investigate individual behavior.
First, I investigated Puzzle 1 by separating the data of CCMajority and the data of CPMajority
from the data of other situations and ran a probit regression for each treatment, predicting the
relationship between voting decisions and various variables related to the pivotal voter model,
clustering standard errors at the individual level.
Regression models involve the following variables. The Vote dummy dependent variable equaled
1 when a subject decided to vote. Four independent variables were used to test the predictions of
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the pivotal voter model. (1) Belief of being Pivotal : a subject’s stated belief about the probability
that her vote would be pivotal. (2) lead = 0 or -1 : a dummy variable equal to 1 if a subject’s
stated belief about the lead of her group (not including this subject’s own vote) equaled −1 or
zero. This dummy variable equal to 1 implied that she believed her vote would change the election
outcome. (3) lead of the majority if in majority: a subject’s stated belief about the lead of her
group (not including this subject’s own vote) if that number was positive; otherwise, the variable
equaled zero. (4) Voting Cost : a subject’s Y bonus which was randomly drawn in each period. In
addition to these four variables, I followed Duffy and Tavits (2008) and Agranov et al. (2012) to
create other relevant independent variables: Voted at t-1, Won at t-1, Voted and Won at t-1, and
Period.8
Findings. Regression results for CCMajority and CPMajority are presented here (Table 3.5 ) and
regression results for other situations are presented in the Appendix B.1 (Table B.2) since I would
like focus on discussing the results of CCMajority and CPMajority. As expected, Voting Cost is
significantly negative in the two tables, lead of the majority if in majority and lead = 0 or -1 are
significantly positive in Table 3.5, and Belief of being Pivotal is significantly positive in Table B.2.
These results are consistent with the predictions of the pivotal voter model.
However, to my surprise, Belief of being Pivotal is significantly negative in Table 3.5, implying
that in CCMajority and CPMajority, subjects were more likely to vote when they believed that
the probability that they would be pivotal was low. This result contradicts another result that
lead = 0 or -1 is significantly positive in Table 3.5 since it suggests that subjects were more likely
to vote when they believed their own vote would change the election outcome. To explain this
contradiction, the literature has provided an explanation: the bandwagon effects. However, the
negative significance of lead of the majority if in majority in Table 3.5 shows that subjects were
less likely to vote when they believed that the lead of their group would be large, implying that
the bandwagon effects did not emerge in my experiment.
To solve the contradiction, I separated the CCMajority data into five groups based on subjects’
stated pivotality probabilities. Then, I calculated the frequency distribution of subjects’ stated
leads for each group. It is noteworthy that the minimum lead in CCMajority is −1, meaning
that subjects in CCMajority would either be pivotal or win the election without voting. Figure
8The coefficients of these variables are consistent with those in Duffy and Tavits (2008) and Agranov et al. (2012).
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Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution of Stated Leads: CCMajority
3.2 shows that subjects who stated a high pivotality probability, say 0.8 6 the stated pivotality
probability 6 1, were more likely to guess that there would be a tie without their own vote. In
contrast, subjects who stated a low pivotality probability, say 0 6 the stated pivotality probability
< 0.2, were more likely to guess that there would be a lead of their group without their own vote.
According to Figure 3.2, the negative significance of Belief of being Pivotal in CCMajority implies
that subjects were more willing to vote when they believed their group would have a lead with
a high probability (i.e., their pivotality probability was low) than when they believed their group
would have a lead with a low probability (i.e., their pivotality probability was high).
But if subjects believed their group would win with a very high probability regardless of their
own vote, their voting propensity became low. This is shown by the positive significance of lead
= 0 or -1 and the negative significance of lead of the majority if in majority. I use the following
example to explain this idea clearly. Figure 3.3 provides three cases for a voter i. Note that lead is
defined as i’s group’s votes (not including i’s own vote) minus i’s competing group’s votes, which
is the same as the variable in Table 3.5. Case 1: i’ belief of being pivotal is very high and i’s belief
that i’s group would win without i’s vote is low. Case 2: i believes that the situation in which i
will be pivotal is most likely to happen, but i also believes that i’s group would win without i’s
vote is very likely to happen. Case 3: i believes that i’s group would win without i’s vote is most
likely to happen. The pivotal voter model predicts that i is more likely to vote for Case 1 than for
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Figure 3.3: Example
Case 2, and more likely to vote for Case 2 than for Case 3. But based on the results from Table
3.5 and Figure 3.2, I would expect that i is least likely to vote for Case 3, but more likely to vote
for Case 2 than for Case 1. More precisely, given that i believes that “the situation where i will be
pivotal” is most likely to happen, I claim that i’s voting propensity increases with i’s predictions
of i’s group’s advantage (i.e., lead > 1).
Psychological Explanation. A good explanation for the discussion above comes from Psychology.
My hypothesis is that leading in interim stages has a positive psychological impact on performance
in tournaments—in fact, many studies have demonstrated this phenomenon. Theoretically, Krumer
(2013) studied a best-of-two contest between two teams, where the winner is the player who wins
in both stages. He demonstrated that winning in the first stage provides a psychological advantage
in the second stage.
Experimentally, Duffy and Tavits (2008) tested individuals’ voting behavior in the laboratory.
Before each election, they randomly decided which group would win in the event of a tie (the
advantaged group) and viewed it as proxying for a preelection poll announcing a lead to one
candidate. The pivotal voter model predicts lower turnout for the advantaged group. However, their
experimental data showed that the turnout was statistically significantly higher for the advantaged
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group than that for the disadvantaged group, which is very similar to what was found in my paper.9
Empirically, Gonzalez-Diaz and Palacios-Huerta (2010) used data from chess tournaments and
found that a player who draws the white pieces in the first game has a significant advantage to win
the entire contest. In their data, “subjects who play with the white pieces win 28 percent of the
chess games whereas those who play with the black pieces win just 18 percent (the remaining 54
percent are draws) in chess tournaments. But given that in a match both players play exactly the
same amount of games with the same colors, no player is given an advantage in terms of playing
more frequently with the white pieces. Therefore, they attributed their finding to the psychological
effect that players who begin playing with the white pieces are randomly given a greater opportunity
to lead in the partial score during the match, and leading has a drastic psychological impact on
performance in this competitive situation” (pp. 7-8).
As a result, if we view the stage where subjects were informed of which situation they were in
as the first stage of the tournament and view the stage where subjects had to decide whether or
not to vote as the second stage of the tournament, being assigned to CCMajority can be viewed as
leading in the first stage of the tournament, resulting in higher voter turnout than what the theory
predicts.
Comparison of the Information-Revealing Mechanisms. The frequency distributions of
subjects’ stated leads for CPMajority and PCMajority are displayed in Figures B.5 and B.7, re-
spectively. In these two situations, there are more subjects stating lead = −1 than in CCMajority,
so the distributions in Figures B.5 and B.7 are similar to each other but not similar to the dis-
tributions in Figure 3.2. But if we condider the cumulative distribution functions for the stated
leads of different stated-pivotality-probability groups, then we obtain the same result as what was
found from Figure 3.2; that is, subjects who stated a high pivotality probability were more likely
to guess that they would be pivotal in the election, while subjects who stated a low pivotality
probability were more likely to guess that there would be a lead of their group without their own
vote.10 Figures for CPMajority and PCMajority are presented the Appendix B.1.
Recall that Table 3.4 displays that in PCMajority, the observed turnout rate (pˆB(3, 0.6)) is not
significantly different from the Nash equilibrium prediction (p∗B(3, 0.6)), and is not significantly
9See Duffy and Tavits (2008), pp. 613-614 for more details.
10I also ran a regression for PCMajority and obtained a negative coefficient of Belief of being Pivotal just like the
regression results from CCMajority and CPMajority.
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Figure 3.4: Frequency Distribution of Stated Pivotality Probabilities
different from the the best-response-to-subjective-belief turnout rate (ˆˆpB(3, 0.6)). This implies
that subjects were not more willing to vote in PCMajority, when compared with the theoretical
predictions, which is different from what we found in CCMajority and CPMajority. Figure 3.4,
which displays displays the frequency distributions of subjects’ stated pivotality probabilities for
PCMajority, CPMajority, and CCMajority, explains this inconsistency. As can be seen, compared
with the CCMajority and CPMajority subjects, the PCMajority subjects were much more likely
to guess that they would be pivotal in the election, and were much less likely to guess that their
group would have a lead without their own vote. Their guess is very reasonable because according
to the setting of the experiments, the PCMajority subjects’ competing group (i.e., the A group)
would have at least 3 votes with a relatively high probability of 0.6. Therefore, unlike being in
CCMajority or in CPMajority, when subjects were informed of being in PCMajority, most of them
did not view it as leading in the tournament, and thus the psychological effect mentioned above
did not emerge on their voting behavior.
One aim of the present paper is to compare the two information-revealing mechanisms: polls
and campaigns. I therefore calculated the frequency distributions of subjects’ stated leads and
the frequency distributions of subjects’ stated pivotality probabilities for CPFaceMinority and
PCFaceMinority, and found that only few CPFaceMinority and PCFaceMinority subjects guessed
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that their groups would have a lead without their own votes.11 This implies that when compared
with campaigns, it is more difficult to cause the psychological effect mentioned above by polls. This
is reinforced by the facts from Tables 3.3 and 3.4, where the observed turnout rates are close to
the best-response-to-subjective-belief turnout rates in CPFaceMinority and PCFaceMinority. In
conclusion, the present study demonstrates that the information about being in an advantageous
position revealed through campaigns would encourage a higher turnout than the best response to
voters’ belief of being pivotal due to the psychological effect, while it is more difficult for polls to
cause the same effect. Result 3 summarizes the discussions above.
Result 3. When subjects were informed of being in an advantageous position by campaigns, their
turnout became significantly higher than the best response to their belief of being pivotal, which can
be attributed to that leading in an interim stage has a positive psychological impact on performance
in tournaments. On the other hand, when compared with campaigns, it is more difficult for polls to
cause the same effect.
Payoff Efficiency. Finally, I would like to examine the payoff efficiency of subjects’ decisions
relative to best response to see why CCMajority and CPMajority subjects did not move toward the
rational choice12 over time. Specifically, I followed Duffy and Tavits (2008) to calculate the payoffs
subjects would have earned if they had played best responses to their subjective probabilities of
pivotality in each period. Table 3.6 reports the ratio of actual payoffs to hypothetical best response
payoffs for each situation. We see that subjects earned slightly higher payoffs than they would
have had they played best responses to their subjective pivotality probabilities in CCMajority and
CPMajority. This finding suggests that, while subjects did not play best responses to their stated
beliefs in CCMajority and CPMajority (due to the psychological effect), they didn’t seem to have
been monetarily worse off as the result, so it is reasonable that they did not move toward the
rational choice predictions (Duffy and Tavits (2008), p.613).
Discussion for Puzzle 2
Table 3.4 shows that the CP and PC treatment subjects overestimating their beliefs of being
pivotal caused higher turnout in Minority and in FaceMinority but underestimating those beliefs
11I did not put the relative figures in the paper.
12Here rational choice refers to subjects’ best responses to their subjective probabilities of pivotality, in terms of
monetary payoffs.
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Table 3.6: Ratios of Actual to Hypothetical Best Response
Ratios of Actual to Best Response Payoffs
Situation Ratio Situation Ratio Situation Ratio Situation Ratio
CCMajority 1.052 CPMajority 1.065 PCMajority 1.012 PPMajority 1.040
CCMinority 1.166 CPMinority 1.305 PCMinority 1.276 PPMinority 1.034
Tie1 1.083 CPFaceMajority 1.216 PCFaceMajority 1.175
Tie3 1.049 CPFaceMinority 1.070 PCFaceMinority 0.990
caused lower turnout in Majority and in FaceMajority than the corresponding Nash equilibrium
predictions (Puzzle 2). In contrast, almost all CC and PP treatment subjects formed pivotality
beliefs consistent with the corresponding Nash equilibrium predictions.
In order to understand how subjects formed their beliefs, I ran a OLS regression for each
situation, with robust standard errors clustered on individuals. Three independent variables were
Period, Belief at t-1 (i.e., each subject’s belief of being pivotal in the last period), and Observation
at t-1 (i.e., a dummy variable equal to one for a subject if this subject was pivotal in the last period).
Period is insignificant in every regression, suggesting that beliefs did not change significantly over
time. Table 3.7 displays the results of Belief at t-1 and Observation at t-1. As shown, in each
situation the coefficient of Belief at t-1 is very significant, while the coefficient of Observation at
t-1 is insignificant and small in magnitude. This shows that for a given period, subjects did not
use the historical data of actual decisiveness to adjust their beliefs of being pivotal but formed
their beliefs by following their prior subjective beliefs about pivotality. This may be because of the
setting of the experiments: In each of the CC, CP , and PC treatment, one of the four situations
would randomly emerge in each period, making it difficult for subjects to learn from the actual
outcomes of each situation.
In the real world, voters would experience the same types of elections every several years, not
every year. Further, the situation for the current election may be different from the situation for the
last election. As a result, it may not be easy for voters to learn from historical election outcomes,
just like the setting of the experiments in the present paper. Hence, it is important to know what
made subjects form a higher or lower prior belief about pivotality than the Nash equilibrium value
for each situation. Nonetheless, I don’t have enough data to study this question for now, so I leave
this question open for future work. A possible explanation is from Kahneman and Tversky (1972)
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Table 3.7: Belief Formation - Dependent Variable: Belief of being Pivotal
Treatment CC Majority Minority Tie1 Tie3
Belief at t-1 0.286∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗
(0.0975) (0.0519) (0.0615) (0.0934)
Observation at t-1 -0.00276 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0715∗∗∗
(0.0385) (0.0278) (0.0195)
N 188 188 316 244
Treatment CP Majority Minority FaceMajority FaceMinority
Belief at t-1 0.608∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗
(0.0882) (0.0897) (0.0799) (0.0861)
Observation at t-1 0.0980∗∗ 0.0878∗∗ 0.00511 0.0236
(0.0419) (0.0362) (0.0325) (0.0314)
N 263 241 263 241
Treatment PC Majority Minority FaceMajority FaceMinority
Belief at t-1 0.317∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗ 0.300∗∗
(0.0767) (0.110) (0.104) (0.118)
Observation at t-1 0.0438 0.0264 0.0253 0.0198
(0.0452) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0338)
N 304 229 304 230
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that “people follow a heuristic called representativeness to evaluate the probability of an uncertain
event by the degree to which it is similar in essential properties to its parent population” (p. 431).
This conjecture is supported by the findings reported in Table 3.8, where each representativeness-
based turnout rate (denoted p˜) in CP , PC, or PP treatment is a weighted average of turnout rates
in the situations of the CC treatment.13
3.5 Conclusion
This paper is an experimental examination of information revelation in a voting model. Typically
parties can conduct public events, such as rallies or demonstrations that reveal their level of support
in hopes this might influence voter turnout and the outcome of the election. How effective is this?
I compare two information-revealing mechanisms in the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model: one
through which active supporters show their support without paying costs (“polls”), which can be
13In other words, CPMinority turnout rate was calculated by 0.6 × CCTie1 turnout plus 0.4 × CCMinority
turnout (i.e., 0.542 = 0.6× 0.635 + 0.4 × 0.402), CPMajority turnout rate was calculated by 0.4 × CCTie3 turnout
plus 0.6 × CCMajority turnout (i.e., 0.794 = 0.4 × 0.87 + 0.6× 0.659), and so on.
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Table 3.8: Turnout Rates–Representativeness-Based Turnout Rates (p˜)
No. of
Subjects RA;πA RB ;πB pˆA p˜A pˆB p˜B
CC 26 1 1 0.635 - 0.635 -
3 1 0.659 - 0.402 -
1 3 0.402 - 0.659 -
3 3 0.870 - 0.870 -
CP 28 1 0.4 0.554 0.542 0.677 0.645
3 0.4 0.794 0.743 0.533 0.589
PC 30 0.6 1 0.661 0.649 0.634 0.495
0.6 3 0.609 0.683 0.746 0.786
PP 28 0.6 0.4 0.735 0.663 0.692 0.611
viewed as cheap talk; the other where active supporters have to pay their time (active participation
in “campaigns”) or money (e.g., contributing to super PACs) to support their preferred candidates,
thus providing more certainty about the actual level of support. To capture the difference between
the two mechanisms, I assume that polls reveal the distribution of active supporters of a party,
while the campaigns provide the actual numbers of the active supporters of that party.
There are two main experimental findings. First, in most of the situations, subjects followed
the main ideas of the Palfrey-Rosenthal pivotal voter model, with appropriately responding to the
cost of voting and the belief of being pivotal. Second, however, when subjects were informed of
being in an advantageous position by campaigns, their turnout became significantly higher than
the best response to their pivotality belief. On the other hand, compared with campaigns, it is
more difficult for polls to cause the same effect.
A possible explanation for the second finding comes from psychological studies on momentum
effects. Specifically, leading in interim stages has a positive psychological impact on performance
in tournaments. Therefore, an election can be viewed as a tournament with two stages, and being
informed by campaigns that the preferred party is the favorite in the election can be viewed as
leading in the first stage, which causes a positive effect on participants’ propensity to vote in the
second stage. Mago, Samak, and Sheremeta (2013) have examined the psychological momentum
effect in a best-of-three contest. I will design a new experiment to test this effect in a best-of-two
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contest (which is what this paper is about). I expect to find that winning the first stage of the
contest has a positive psychological effect on encouraging contestants to put in more effort in the
second stage.
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Chapter 4
Rallying Strategy in Two-Party
Elections
4.1 Introduction
“In 2000, Nader wanted to achieve at least a 5% size of the presidential vote in order to secure
public funding for the Green Party’s candidate in 2004. But to do so, he needed to convince voters
that it was possible for him to generate that large of a share of the vote. He attempted to do so with
rallies.”–Rebecca B. Morton (2006)
A dramatic transformation in voter mobilization has taken place over the past half-century, with
candidates, parties, and countless businesses and organizations spending large amounts of resources
to influence voters.1 Mobilization tools include direct mail and telephone campaigns, door-to-door
canvassing, TV advertising, speeches, and rallies. Rallies can serve as coordination mechanisms in
multi-candidate races, especially for candidates who are trying to project images of strong current
support among voters.2 In the final days of a campaign, a successful rally can strengthen existing
support and encourage less enthusiastic voters to cast their ballots.3 Empirical evidence of these
effects has been gathered by Finkel and Schrott (1995), Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944),
and Mattlin (2004).
1See Gerber and Green (2000) p.653 and Druckman et al. (2011) p.422.
2See Morton (2006) p.201.
3See Mattlin (2004) p.162.
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The goal of this research is to analyze candidates’ rallying strategies in two-party races. This
paper views political rallies as an information-revealing mechanism that allows candidates to project
images of strong current support among voters. Compared with previous studies on campaign
effects, this project starts from investigating voting behavior based on the Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985) (P-R) pivotal voter model. Then, the mechanism through which the support is shown in
rallies is demonstrated through the informational impact in the P-R pivotal voter model. More
specifically, in my model, there are two types of supporters: base supporters (those who always turn
out to vote for their preferred candidates) and passive supporters (those who vote strategically).
A randomly chosen voter may be a base supporter (π probability) or a passive supporter (1 − π
probability). The probability π is common knowledge, and voters’ types are independent draws.
But the realized number of base supporters is unknown unless a rally is held. If a rally is held,
base supporters will automatically attend the rally organized by the candidate they support, and
passive supporters will stay away. Hence, by holding a rally, candidates and supporters learn the
realized number of base supporters.
A two-stage game is used to study the signaling purpose of rallies. In the first stage of my
model, two candidates simultaneously decide whether or not to organize rallies. The candidates do
not know how many people will show up when they decide whether or not to hold rallies. That
is, the information about the numbers of base and passive supporters can only be revealed by
holding rallies. If there is no rally during the election, the only known information is π. In the
second stage, passive supporters decide whether or not to vote based on their observations of rally
outcomes. According to the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) turnout model, if the cost of voting for
passive supporters exceeds zero, they will vote if they perceive that their votes are pivotal. In such
situations, candidates can use rallies to disseminate information about their chances of winning.
For a candidate, if a rally can encourage the passive supporters of his party to vote or discourage
the passive supporters of the competing party from voting, then this candidate has an incentive to
hold the rally.
Rally decisions depend on π and the size difference between one’s party and the competing
party. To further investigate the effects of holding a rally, I study two cases. One is the case where
the sizes of the parties are equal; the other is the case where π values are equal. For the first case,
my model predicts that when the sizes are equal, the party with a smaller π is more likely hold a
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rally (Hypothesis 1). This is because the party with a smaller π can eliminate the disadvantage of
the lower ratio of base supporters by holding a rally. Otherwise, its passive supporters will believe
that their chance of winning is lower than the competing party, leading to their lack of willingness
to vote. On the other hand, the party with a higher π should not hold a rally since if it does not
hold a rally, its passive supporters will believe that they have a chance to win due to the higher π.
But if a rally is held and few of its base supporters show up at the rally, its passive supporters will
be discouraged from voting. For the second case, my model predicts that when the π values of the
two parties are equal and the size of a party is twice as big as that of another party, the big party
will hold a rally, while the small party will not (Hypothesis 2). The intuition is as follows. Since the
big party has a size advantage, if it can further show that it has many base supporters, then small
party passive supporters will believe that their candidate is very likely to lose, increasing their lack
of willingness to vote. On the other hand, the small party should not hold a rally since holding a
rally cannot help to eliminate its size disadvantage.
To further investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2, I consider empirical data from U.S. presidential
elections. Reliable state-by-state data on rallying strategies of presidential candidates can be found
in Shaw (1999a). Shaw (1999a) provides the data on “candidate appearances,” which are recorded
as the total number of visits made to each state and D.C. for political rallies in the 1988, 1992,
and 1996 U.S. presidential elections. Therefore, data on candidate appearances provided by Shaw
(1999a) can stand as proxy for candidates’ rallying strategies. The empirical data show that in
most of the battleground states, if partisanship leans to the Democratic (Republican), Republican
(Democratic) Party organized more candidate appearances than the Democratic (Republican) Party
did, supporting Hypothesis 1. The empirical data also show that in most of the Base Democratic
(Republican) states, the Democratic (Republican) Party organized more candidate appearances
than the Republican (Democratic) Party did, supporting Hypothesis 2.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model and compares
winning probabilities of holding a rally with those of not holding a rally. Further, it presents defi-
nitions of equilibria, followed by applying equilibrium analysis to a study of real-world situations.
In Section 4.3, I explore the effects of holding a rally in two cases, followed by deriving two hy-
potheses. Section 4.4 uses empirical data to examine the hypotheses and the effectiveness of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 The Benchmark Model
My model is based on Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and Levine and Palfrey (2007) turnout mod-
els, in which voters have privately known voting costs. A total of N¯ voters can choose between
candidates 1 and 2. Each voter belongs to one of two parties, T1 or T2, with N1 voters in T1 and
N2 voters in T2, such that N1 +N2 = N¯ and N1 6 N2. T1 voters prefer candidate 1, and T2 voters
prefer candidate 2. Voters can be further categorized into two types: base supporters and passive
supporters. It is assumed that base supporters have zero voting costs, which causes that voting
is considered a dominant strategy. For passive supporter A, voting cost is denoted as cA and is
set to be greater than zero for any A. In addition, cA is independently drawn from a common
density function f(c), and is privately known by A before A decides whether or not to vote. The
density function of the cost distribution, f(c), is common knowledge and is assumed to be positive
everywhere on its support.
A voter in T1 is a base supporter with probability π1 and a passive supporter with probability
1− π1, where π1 is commonly known by all, and types are independent draws. Hence, the number
of T1 base supporters is a random variable with a binomial distribution with parameters N1 and
π1. Similarly, a voter in T2 is a base supporter with probability π2 and a passive supporter with
probability 1−π2, where π2 is commonly known by all, and types are independent draws. Therefore,
the number of T2 base supporters is a random variable with a binomial distribution with parameters
N2 and π2.
An election process can be modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, candidates 1 and
2 simultaneously decide whether or not to conduct rallies. It is assumed that base supporters will
automatically attend, and passive supporters will not.4 The candidates do not know how many
people will show up when they decide whether or not to hold rallies. That is, the information about
the realized numbers of base and passive supporters can only be revealed by holding rallies. If there
is no rally during the election, the only known information are (N1, N2) and (π1, π2). Hence, by
4An implicit assumption here is that the cost of attending the rallies is zero for base supporters and unacceptably
high for passive supporters. Readers may challenge the zero rally cost assumption as unrealistic, but the key issue is
whether the organizing of rallies and size of base support encourage passive supporters to vote. Thus, adding positive
rally costs into the model would make it more complex without providing new insight.
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holding rallies, candidates and supporters learn the realized numbers of base supporters.
In the second stage, an election is held, and base supporters vote regardless of the rally outcome,
while passive supporters decide whether or not to vote based on their observations of the numbers
of base supporters who attend their respective rallies. To vote, passive supporter A must pay voting
cost cA. Whichever candidate receives more votes wins the election. In the event of a tie, a fair
coin is tossed to decide the winner. If candidate 1 wins, then candidate 1 and all T1 voters receive
a reward of H and candidate 2 as well as all T2 voters receive a reward of L < H. The opposite
occurs if candidate 2 wins. These rewards are common knowledge.
I assume that in the second stage, passive supporters in the same party use the same decision
rule in equilibrium. According to Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), a quasi-symmetric equilibrium
consists of a pair of critical points (cˆ1, cˆ2) such that any passive supporter A in T1 votes if and
only if cA < cˆ1, and any passive supporter A in T2 votes if and only if cA < cˆ2. A quasi-symmetric
equilibrium implies an aggregate voting probability for passive supporters in each party, (pˆ1, pˆ2),
given by:
pˆ1 =
∫ cˆ1
0
f(c)dc = F (cˆ1) (4.1)
pˆ2 =
∫ cˆ2
0
f(c)dc = F (cˆ2). (4.2)
Since (cˆ1, cˆ2) is an equilibrium, for an interior solution, a passive supporter with a cost equal to
(cˆ1, cˆ2) should be indifferent between voting and abstaining. As a result,
cˆ1 =
H − L
2
qˆ1 (4.3)
cˆ2 =
H − L
2
qˆ2 (4.4)
where qˆ1 (qˆ2) is the probability that a vote cast by a passive supporter in the T1 (T2) party will
be pivotal (i.e., make or break a tie), given the equilibrium voting strategies of all other voters in
both parties.
Let R1 and R2 represent the numbers of the base supporters attending the rallies held by
candidates 1 and 2, respectively. In the cases where candidate i does not hold a rally, Ri is defined
as an empty set (i.e., Ri = ∅). The values of (cˆ1, cˆ2), (pˆ1, pˆ2), and (qˆ1, qˆ2) depend on candidate
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actions, (R1, R2), and (π1, π2). More precisely, if both candidates hold rallies, the values depend on
(R1, R2); if only one candidate, say candidate 1, holds a rally, the values depend on R1 and π2; and
if no candidates hold rallies, the values only depend on (π1, π2). The calculations of these values
are shown in Appendix C.1.
Given those values resulting from candidate actions, Probi(win|R1, R2) denotes the conditional
probability of candidate i winning, Probi(lose|R1, R2) the conditional probability of candidate i
losing, and Probi(tie|R1, R2) the conditional probability of a tie. Note that Probi(tie|R1, R2) =
Probj(tie|R1, R2) and Probi(win|R1, R2) = Probj(lose|R1, R2), where j is i’s opposing candidate.
The calculations of these values are also shown in Appendix C.1. Since if it is a tie, candidate i has
a probability of 0.5 to win, for the following discussions I define candidate i’s conditional winning
probability given (R1, R2) as Probi(W |R1, R2) ≡ 0.5Probi(tie|R1, R2) + Probi(win|R1, R2).
In the first stage, as stated, both candidates simultaneously decide whether or not to hold
rallies. Given conditional winning probabilities Probi(W |R1, R2), I can compute unconditional
winning probabilities of holding and of not holding rallies. The unconditional winning probability
for candidate i is denoted as Wi(s1, s2), where si = Y if candidate i holds a rally and si = N
otherwise. And note that the unconditional winning probability for i’s competitor, candidate j, is
Wj(s1, s2) = 1−Wi(s1, s2).
There are three possible action profiles: both candidates hold rallies, only one candidate does,
or neither candidate does. For the following discussions, without loss of generosity, I take candidate
1 as an example. If both candidates hold rallies, the probability of candidate 1 winning is
W1(Y, Y ) =
N1∑
R1=0
N2∑
R2=0
(
N1
R1
)(
N2
R2
)
πR11 (1− π1)
N1−R1πR22 (1− π2)
N2−R2Prob1(W |R1, R2). (4.5)
If candidate 1 holds a rally but candidate 2 does not, the probability of candidate 1 winning is
W1(Y,N) =
N1∑
R1=0
(
N1
R1
)
πR11 (1− π1)
N1−R1Prob1(W |R1, ∅). (4.6)
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Similarly, if candidate 1 does not hold a rally but candidate 2 does. Then
W1(N,Y ) =
N2∑
R2=0
(
N2
R2
)
πR22 (1− π2)
N2−R2Prob1(W |∅, R2). (4.7)
If neither candidate holds a rally,
W1(N,N) = Prob1(W |∅, ∅). (4.8)
To compare the winning probability of holding a rally with that of not holding a rally, it is
helpful to study them with graphs. In the following, without loss of generosity, I study how holding
a rally affects the winning probability by taking candidate 1 as an example. Following Levine and
Palfrey (2007), the payoffs used to calculate winning probabilities are L = 5 and H = 105, with a
uniform distribution of voting costs ranging from 0 to 55.
Candidate 2 Holds a Rally
I first assume that candidate 2 holds a rally to study the winning probabilities W1(Y, Y ) and
W1(N,Y ). Figure 4.1 consists of three subfigures. Each shows candidate 1’s winning probabilities
of holding a rally and of not holding a rally under a pair (π1, π2) given that N1 = 3, N2 = 6, and
candidate 2 holds a rally. The top two subfigures share the same π2 but different π1, and the left
two subfigures share the same π1 but different π2.
There are four bars and a line in each subfigure. The number r, where r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, on top
of a bar represents the rally turnout (i.e., R1 = r). For convenience, I call a bar with a number
r ‘r-bar’ in the following discussions. The height of a r-bar represents candidate 1’s conditional
winning probability given R1 = r, and it can be expressed as
N2∑
R2=0
(
N2
R2
)
πR22 (1− π2)
N2−R2Prob1(W |r,R2),
implying that π2 determines the heights of r-bars. This is shown by the left two subfigures: The
width of the r-bar, where r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, in the top subfigure is the same as it in the bottom
subfigure, but the heights of the r-bars in the two subfigures are different.
The width of a r-bar represents the probability that R1 = r emerges, and it can be expressed
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Figure 4.1: Candidate 1’s winning probability in the case where N1 = 3, N2 = 6, and candidate 2
holds a rally.
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as (
N1
r
)
πR11 (1− π1)
N1−R1 ,
implying that π1 determines the widths of r-bars. This is shown by the top two subfigures where
the heights of r-bars are the same, but the widths of r-bars are different. Note that the sum of the
widths of r-bars is 1; that is,
N1∑
R1=0
(
N1
r
)
πR11 (1− π1)
N1−R1 = 1.
Accordingly, from each subfigure, candidate 1’s (unconditional) winning probability of holding a
rally can be represented by the sum of the areas of r-bars, which is
N1∑
R1=0
{(
N1
r
)
πR11 (1− π1)
N1−R1 ×
N2∑
R2=0
(
N2
R2
)
πR22 (1− π2)
N2−R2Prob1(W |r,R2)
}
.
This is the same asW1(Y, Y ) shown by equation (4.5). For convenience, I call this area Area(Y, Y ).
As to the line in each subfigure, the area calculated from the height of the line times the width
1 represents candidate 1’s winning probability of not holding a rally, W1(N,Y ). For convenience, I
call this area Area(N,Y ). Candidate 1 should decide whether or not to hold a rally by comparing
Area(Y, Y ) and Area(N,Y ). For example, the top left subfigure shows that when π1 = 0.7 and π2 =
0.1, candidate 1 should hold a rally since Area(Y, Y ) > Area(N,Y ) (i.e., the winning probability
of holding a rally is higher than that of not holding a rally).
Candidate 2 Does Not Hold a Rally
Now suppose that candidate 2 does not hold a rally. Subfigures in Figure 4.2 show candidate
1’s winning probabilities of holding a rally and those of not holding a rally given that N1 = 3,
N2 = 6, and candidate 2 does not hold a rally. These subfigures show the same characteristics as
Figure 4.1. More precisely, the different widths of r-bars in the top two subfigures show that π1
determines the probability that R1 = r, where r ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the different heights of r-bars in
the left two subfigures show that π2 determines the conditional winning probability given R1 = r.
An important finding comes from comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 share the
same values for each of the parameters N1, N2, π1, and π2, except that candidate 2 holds a rally in
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Figure 4.2: Candidate 1’s winning probability in the case where N1 = 3, N2 = 6, and candidate 2
does not hold a rally.
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Figure 4.1 but not in Figure 4.2. Given this setting, I ask the following question: Should candidate
1 hold a rally when candidate 2 holds a rally or when candidate 2 does not hold a rally? I first
compare the top subfigures in Figure 4.1 with those in Figure 4.2 to study the case where π2 = 0.1.
As shown, the 3-bar is much higher than the line in each of the top subfigures in Figure 4.1, while
the 3-bar is only a little higher than the line in each of the top subfigures in Figure 4.2. In other
words, when π2 is low, candidate 1 should be more likely to hold a rally if candidate 2 holds a rally
(Figure 4.1) than if candidate 2 does not hold a rally (Figure 4.2).
This is because when π2 is low, if candidate 2 holds a rally, there will be a high probability that
few T2 base supporters show up at the rally. If it is the case, the event that R1 = 3 will discourage
T2 passive supporters from voting, leading to the conditional winning probability given R1 = 3
being high. On the other hand, if candidate 2 does not hold a rally, even in the case where R1 is
large and π2 is low, T2 passive supporters will still believe that candidate 2 has a chance to win
since there are more voters in T2. Therefore, T2 passive supporters may still turn out to vote when
R1 = 3, leading to the conditional winning probability given R1 = 3 being low. However, if π2 is
not so low, π2 = 0.6 for example, the pattern in Figure 4.1 will be similar to that in Figure 4.2 (See
the bottom subfigures in Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
Does a successful rally always increase the winning probability?
From Figures 4.1 and 4.2, candidate 1’s conditional winning probability increases in R1. How-
ever, having a successful rally (i.e., R1 is large) does not always increase the conditional winning
probability. This is because in addition to encouraging T1 passive supporters to vote, a successful
rally held by candidate 1 may also encourage T2 passive supporters to vote if T2 passive supporters
believe that they need to vote to win the election after witnessing many T1 base supporters showing
up at the rally.
For example, consider the case where N1 = 4 and N2 = 5. The top subfigures in Figure 4.3 show
that the conditional winning probabilities increase in R1 when π2 = 0.1, while the bottom subfigure
shows that when π2 = 0.6 the conditional winning probability given R1 = 4 is lower than that given
R1 = 3 (i.e., the 4-bar is lower than the 3-bar). In other words, given that π1 = 0.7, π2 = 0.6, and
candidate 2 holds a rally, for candidate 1, having a very successful rally decreases the conditional
winning probability. This is because witnessing R1 = 4 encourages T2 passive supporters to vote if
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Figure 4.3: Candidate 1’s winning probability in the case where N1 = 4, N2 = 5, and candidate 2
holds a rally.
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R2 is not too small. If π2 = 0.6, R2 may not be too small, while it is very likely that R2 is small
if π2 = 0.1. Hence, witnessing R1 = 4 does not encourage T2 passive supporters to vote in the top
cases where π2 = 0.1, while it encourages T2 passive supporters to vote in the bottom case where
π2 = 0.6, leading to the conditional winning probability given R1 = 4 being lower.
4.2.2 Equilibrium
After discussing the winning probabilities, I now move on to analyze equilibria. Since candidate i
receives a reward of H if winning and receives a reward of L if losing,
Ui(s1, s2) =Wi(s1, s2)×H + (1−Wi(s1, s2))× L, (4.9)
where i ∈ {1, 2}, s1 ∈ {Y,N}, and s2 ∈ {Y,N}. A payoff matrix can be obtained given any
N1, N2, π1, and π2 (Table 4.1). The focus in this paper is on a particular class of equilibria in
which candidates play pure actions in the first stage; in the second stage, passive supporters decide
whether or not to vote according to the corresponding critical point (cˆ1, cˆ2). There are four possible
equilibria in this class.
Definition 1. Rally Equilibrium: If U1(Y, Y ) > U1(N,Y ) and U2(Y, Y ) > U2(Y,N), an equilibrium
exists in which both candidates hold rallies in the first stage; this is referred to as a rally equilibrium.
Definition 2. Non-rally Equilibrium: If U1(N,N) > U1(Y,N) and U2(N,N) > U2(N,Y ), the
equilibrium represents both candidates refraining from holding first-stage rallies; this is referred to
as a non-rally equilibrium.
Definition 3. T1-Rally Equilibrium: If U1(Y,N) > U1(N,N) and U2(Y,N) > U2(Y, Y ), the equi-
librium consists of candidate 1 holding a rally and candidate 2 not holding a rally; this is referred
to as a T1-rally equilibrium.
Definition 4. T2-Rally Equilibrium: If U1(N,Y ) > U1(Y, Y ) and U2(N,Y ) > U2(N,N), the
equilibrium consists of candidate 2 holding a rally and candidate 1 not holding a rally; this is
referred to as a T2-rally equilibrium.
These equilibria can be displayed on equilibrium diagrams in three different cases: N2 = 2N1,
N2 = N1 + 1, and N2 = N1. Since N2 > N1, there is greater interest in the case where π2 6 π1
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium diagrams for N2 = 2N1.
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Table 4.1: The Payoff Matrix
Rally No Rally
Rally (U1(Y, Y ), U2(Y, Y )) (U1(Y,N), U2(Y,N))
No Rally (U1(N,Y ), U2(N,Y )) (U1(N,N), U2(N,N))
in the parameter set Ω = {(π1, π2) : 0 < π2 6 π1 < 1}. In addition to showing the equilibrium
diagrams, to see if the model can explain empirical data, I also apply equilibrium analysis to a
study of real-world situations in N2 = 2N1 and N2 = N1 + 1 cases.
Figure 4.4 presents equilibrium diagrams for different electorate sizes N¯ , with each diagram
showing equilibria where N2 = 2N1. For each diagram, the horizontal axis represents π1 and the
vertical axis represents π2. An equilibrium or equilibria may exist given any pair (π1, π2). Each
diagram is divided into two areas along the diagonal line. The left-up triangle area will not be
discussed since I only focus on the case where π2 6 π1. In the right-down triangle area, green
dots represent rally equilibria, pink dots T2-rally equilibria, purple dots T1-rally equilibria, red dots
non-rally equilibria, and white spaces represent no equilibria.
Real-world Example of the N2 = 2N1 Case
To give an example of a N2 = 2N1 scenario, during the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan,
opinion polls showed Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou receiving between 49% and 55%
voter support, and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieh receiving 28%-31%
(Lin (2009), Table 13).5 The support percentage for candidate i during an election can be expressed
as Ni, i ∈ {1, 2}. By labeling Frank Hsieh candidate 1 and Ma Ying-jeou candidate 2, support
rates are expressed as N2 = 2N1.
Identifying π1 and π2 is the next step. Using Taiwan Electoral Democracy Survey (TEDS)
election data,6 Cheng (2007) used three indices to measures base DPP support: the concepts of
Taiwanese consciousness, Taiwanese regime, and party preference. According to Cheng (2007), I
compute π1 and π2 in Appendix D.1. Their ranges were 0.55-0.65 and 0.08-0.40, respectively.
Given N2 = 2N1, π1 ∈ [0.55, 0.65], and π2 ∈ [0.08, 0.40], according to Figure 4.4, a rally
equilibrium or T2-rally equilibrium was more likely to emerge, suggesting that candidate 2 conduct
5For details on opinion polls from various news agencies and organizations in Taiwan during the election campaign,
visit http://tinyurl.com/7hvy4oc.
6TEDS: http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/home.phtml
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a rally regardless of candidate 1’s decision. In the actual situation, Ma held rallies starting on
May 11, 2007; one of his most important rallies (known as the “Long Stay” rally) was held on
July 11, 2007. Hsieh waited until November 12, 2007 to hold his first rally, indicating that Ma
decided to hold rallies regardless of Hsieh’s decision–an example of a T2-rally equilibrium. My
model predictions are consistent with the actual case.
Real-world Example of the N2 = N1 + 1 Case
Next, consider the case where N2 = N1 + 1. Equilibrium diagrams for different N¯ electorate
sizes are shown in Figure 4.5; each diagram shows the equilibria where N2 = N1 + 1. In another
example involving Taiwan electoral politics, in 2004 opinion polls showed that the KMT candidate
Lien Chan had 38%-42% support, and DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian had 36%-40% (Lin (2009),
Table 13). The small gap was reflected in the actual election, which Chen won by 0.22%. This
can be analyzed as an example of N2 = N1 + 1, where Chen is candidate 1 and Lien is candidate
2. Similar to the N2 = 2N1 case, to find π1 and π2 I used data from the 2004 TEDS to calculate
Cheng’s (2007) indices. I compute the potential π1 and π2 in Appendix D.1. The π1 and π2
ranges were 0.36 to 0.48 and 0.13 to 0.44, respectively. Given N2 = N1 + 1, π1 ∈ [0.36, 0.48], and
π2 ∈ [0.13, 0.44], according to Figure 4.5, a T1-rally equilibrium was more likely to emerge if π1 was
small, and a T2-rally equilibrium was more likely to emerge if π1 was large.
In the actual 2004 presidential campaign, there were two major mass rallies: a “228 Hand-in-
Hand Rally” organized by the DPP on February 28, and a “313” pan-blue (meaning all pro-KMT
parties) rally hled on March 13. At the beginning of the campaign, the prevailing belief was that
Lien would win. However, unlike the N2 = 2N1 example in which Frank Hsieh waited until very
late to organize rallies, the DPP held a very early rally in September of 2003, believing that they
could overcome Lien’s narrow lead. The Hand-in-Hand rally was exceptionally successfully, with
about two million people forming a human chain across the island.7 Until then, the KMT did not
have a mass rally plan,8 therefore this can be viewed as a T1-rally equilibrium example, in which
Chen held a mass rally but Lien did not. This might be because the π1 value was underestimated
before the DPP rally outcome was realized. And this situation is consistent with the prediction of
the model–that is, a T1-rally equilibrium emerged when π1 was small.
7Clark (2004), p.32
8Mattlin (2004), p.13
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium diagrams for N2 = N1 + 1.
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Lien’s lead narrowed significantly following the Hand-in-Hand event,9 with some polls showing
that Chen had taken the lead. According to a China Times poll of 3,391 eligible voters, 40 percent
backed Chen and 38 percent favored Lien. To rally its traditional support base, the pro-KMT
coalition held 24 separate 313 pan-blue rallies on the same date that were also said to attract 2
million participants.10 This situation is consistent with a T2-rally equilibrium–that is, after seeing
the success of the Hand-in-Hand rally, Lien found that the π1 value was larger than estimated,
encouraging him to organize his own rally.
The N2 = N1 Case
For the N2 = N1 case, diagram shown in Figure 4.6 is symmetric along the diagonal, therefore
only the parameter set Ω = {(π1, π2) : 0 < π2 6 π1 < 1} will be considered. And the results of
another parameter set Ωˆ = {(π1, π2) : 0 < π1 6 π2 < 1} can be easily inferred. The figure shows
equilibrium diagrams for different electorate sizes N¯ , with each diagram showing equilibria when
N1 = N2. According to Figure 4.6, I have the following observation: When N1 = N2, a T2-rally
equilibrium is more likely to exist when π2 < π1. This observation will be further discussed in the
next section.
9Wikipedia: Republic of China presidential election, 2004
10Taipei Times (March 7, 2004) and Mattlin (2004).
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Figure 4.6: Equilibrium diagrams for N1 = N2.
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4.3 Effects of Holding a Rally
Figures 4.4-4.6 show that given different N1, N2, π1, and π2 values, different equilibrium outcomes
emerge. This is because positive and negative effects may emerge simultaneously when a rally is
held, and in different cases, different effects are dominant. From candidate i’s point of view, if i
holds a rally, it may encourage Ti passive supporters to vote and/or discourage passive supporters
of Ti’s competing party from voting, which is the positive effect. On the other hand, it may also
discourage Ti passive supporters from voting and/or encourage passive supporters of Ti’s competing
party to vote, which is the negative effect. For any case, if the positive effect of holding a rally is
larger than the negative one, i should hold a rally. Therefore, we should ask the following question:
Under what circumstances should candidate i hold a rally?
To answer this question, it is helpful to study the effects of holding a rally by fixing N1 = N2
and fixing π1 = π2, respectively. Hence, in the following discussions, I will first study the case
where N1 = N2 and π1 > π2. In this case, I call the party with the higher π the strong party, and
call the party with the lower π the weak party. I, then, study the case where π1 = π2 and N1 < N2.
In this case, I call the party with the bigger N the big party, and call the party with the smaller
N the small party.
4.3.1 Strong Party vs. Weak Party
Consider the case where N1 = N2 but π1 > π2. Since π1 > π2, T1 is the strong party and T2 is the
weak party in this subsection. Recall that subsection 4.2.2 observes that given N1 = N2, a T2-rally
equilibrium is more likely to exist when π1 > π2. According to this observation, an equilibrium
where the weak party holds a rally while the strong party does not is more likely to exist when
N1 = N2. For convenience, I call this equilibrium a “weak party rally equilibrium”.
To analyze this observation, I show candidates’ winning probabilities of holding and not holding
rallies with graphs. Figure 4.7 shows four subfigures for the case where N1 = N2 = 6, π1 = 0.8,
and π2 = 0.4. The top two show candidate 2’s winning probabilities in the case where candidate 1
holds a rally (top left subfigure) and in the case where candidate 1 does not hold a rally (top right
subfigure). The bottom two show candidate 1’s winning probabilities in the case where candidate
2 holds a rally (bottom left subfigure) and in the case where candidate 2 does not hold a rally
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Figure 4.7: Candidates’ winning probabilities in the case where N1 = N2 = 6, π1 = 0.8, and
π2 = 0.4.
(bottom right subfigure). From the top two subfigures, candidate 2’s dominant strategy is to hold
a rally regardless of candidate 1’s strategy. On the other hand, candidate 1’s dominant strategy is
not to hold a rally regardless of candidate 2’s strategy, as shown by the bottom two subfigures. As
a result, there is a unique equilibrium, which is the weak party rally equilibrium, in this case.
The intuition is as follows. For candidate 2, who is supported by the weak party, if he does
not hold a rally, the smaller π2 will discourage T2 passive supporters from voting since they don’t
think candidate 2 has a chance to win due to π2 < π1. However, if candidate 2 holds a rally, the
disadvantage of the smaller π2 is eliminated when many T2 base supporters show up at the rally.
We can see this from each of the top subfigures: The 3-bar, 4-bar, 5-bar, and 6-bar are all higher
than the line, leading to the winning probability of holding a rally being larger than that of not
holding a rally. As a result, when N1 = N2, holding a rally is the weak party candidate’s dominant
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strategy since it can eliminate the disadvantage of the smaller π.
On the other hand, candidate 1’s dominant strategy is not to hold a rally. This is because even
if candidate 1 does not hold a rally, T1 passive supporters will believe that candidate 1 has a chance
to win due to π1 > π2, leading to their willingness to vote. Therefore, the winning probability of
not holding a rally is high, as shown by the lines of the bottom subfigures. However, if candidate
1 holds a rally, even if π1 > π2, there is still a chance that few T1 base supporters show up at the
rally, leading to a lower conditional winning probability. This can be seen from each of the bottom
subfigures: The 0-bar, 1-bar, 2-bar, 3-bar, and 4-bar are all lower than the line, resulting in the
winning probability of holding a rally being smaller than that of not holding a rally. In conclusion,
I have a hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1. Suppose that N1 = N2 and π1 > π2. A weak party rally equilibrium is more likely to
exist because the weak party candidate has an incentive to eliminate the disadvantage of the smaller
π by holding a rally.
4.3.2 Big Party vs. Small Party
Now consider another case where π1 = π2 but N2 = 2N1. Since N2 = 2N1, T1 is the small party
and T2 is the big party in this subsection. Recall that Figure 4.4 shows four equilibrium diagrams
for the N2 = 2N1 case. According to Figure 4.4, I observe that an equilibrium where the big party
holds a rally while the small party does not is more likely to exist when N2 = 2N1 and π1 = π2.
For convenience, I call this equilibrium a “big party rally equilibrium”.
To analyze this observation, I take the Figure 4.8 case as an example. Figure 4.8 shows that
there is a unique big party rally equilibrium in the case where N1 = 4, N2 = 8, and π1 = π2 = 0.6.
11
This is because for candidate 1, who is supported by the small party, holding a rally cannot help
to eliminate the size disadvantage of T1 even if many T1 base supporters show up at the rally. This
is shown by the top subfigures in Figure 4.8 that the 3-bars and 4-bars are only a little higher
than the lines. Moreover, if few T1 base supporters show up at the rally, the conditional winning
11The top two subfigures in Figure 4.7 show candidate 1’s winning probabilities in the case where candidate 2 holds
a rally (top left subfigure) and in the case where candidate 2 does not hold a rally (top right subfigure). The bottom
two show candidate 2’s winning probabilities in the case where candidate 1 holds a rally (bottom left subfigure) and in
the case where candidate 1 does not hold a rally (bottom right subfigure). From the top two subfigures, candidate 1’s
dominant strategy is to hold a rally regardless of candidate 2’s strategy. On the other hand, candidate 2’s dominant
strategy is not to hold a rally regardless of candidate 1’s strategy, as shown by the bottom two subfigures.
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Figure 4.8: Candidates’ winning probabilities in the case where N1 = 4, N2 = 8, π1 = π2 = 0.6.
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probabilities will be lower than the winning probability of not holding a rally, as shown by the
0-bars, 1-bars, and 2-bars.
On the other hand, candidate 2, who is supported by the big party, should hold a rally to
prevent T1 passive supporters from voting. This is because N2 is much larger than N1, leading to
candidate 2 winning the election for sure as long as more than four T2 base supporters show up at
the rally (Figure 4.8, bottom subfigures). As a result, I have another hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2. Suppose that N2 = 2N1 and π1 = π2. A big party rally equilibrium is more likely
to exist because the big party candidate has an incentive to prevent the passive supporters of the
small party from voting by holding a rally.
4.4 Testing the Model
To examine the effectiveness of the model, I tested Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 with empirical
data from the 1988, 1992, and 1996 U.S. Presidential elections since rich empirical statewide data
on these three elections can be obtained from existing studies. Three pieces of information are
essential: (1) Democratic Party’s rallying strategy and Republican Party’s rallying strategy, (2)
Democratic Party’s voter support and Republican Party’s voter support respectively represent-
ing N1 and N2, and (3) Democratic Party’s base support and Republican Party’s base support
respectively representing π1 and π2.
Reliable state-by-state data on rallying strategies of presidential candidates can be found in
Shaw (1999a). Shaw (1999a) provides the data for the variable “candidate appearances,” which
are recorded as the total number of visits made to each state and D.C. for political rallies in the
1988, 1992, and 1996 U.S. presidential elections. Therefore, candidate appearance data provided
by Shaw (1999a) can stand as proxy for each party’s rallying strategies. To normalize the data, in
each elections, I calculated the percentage of candidate appearances in each state for each party,
which is a party’s number of candidate appearances in a state divided by that party’s total number
of candidate appearances.
The Democratic Party’s voter support and the Republican party’s voter support were drawn
from Shaw (1999b). According to Shaw (1999b), campaigns tended to sort states into one of five
categories: 1. Base Republican; 2. Lean Republican; 3. Battleground; 4. Lean Democratic; 5.
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Base Democratic. This information can stand as proxy for the voter support of a party in a state.
More specifically, states categorized into Base Republican (Base Democratic) by Shaw (1999b) can
be viewed as examples of N2 = 2N1, where the Democratic (Republican) Party is candidate 1 and
the Republican (Democratic) Party is candidate 2.
With the data on each party’s rallying strategy and the data on each party’s voter support, I
can test Hypothesis 2, which predicts that given a state where one party has big voter support and
the other has small voter support, the party with big voter support is more likely to hold rallies.
Information regarding a party’s base support which represents π1 or π2 are not necessary for this
test because Hypothesis 2 holds as long as π1 is not very different from π2, as shown by Figure
4.4 in Section 4.2.2. Table 4.2 presents the Base Democratic states in the 1988, 1992, or 1996
U.S. presidential election and the percentage of candidate appearances in each state. As shown, in
most of the Base Democratic states, the Democratic Party organized more candidate appearances
than the Republican party did. For example, in the 1996 U.S. Presidential election, there were 11
Base Democratic states with a higher percentage of Democratic candidate appearances, while there
were only 2 Base Democratic states with a higher percentage of Republican candidate appearances.
Similar findings are shown in Table 4.3, which presents the Base Republican states in the 1996,
1992, or 1988 U.S. presidential election and the percentage of candidate appearances in each state.
The data in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 support Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, given a state where two parties have similar voter support, the party
with weak base support in that state organizes more candidate appearances than the party with
strong base support. Therefore, to test Hypothesis 1, states categorized into “Lean Republican,”
“Battleground,” or “Lean Democratic” in Shaw (1999b), which are the states where two parties
have similar voter support, were considered. For convenience, I call these states battlegrounds. In
addition to each party’s voter support and each party’s rallying strategies, information regarding
each party’s base support that represents π1 or π2 is essential for testing Hypothesis 1. The Demo-
cratic Party’s base support and the Republican party’s base support were drawn from Norrander
(2001), which presents state-level public opinion values produced with the data from the American
National Election Study’s survey of Senate races in 1988, 1990, and 1992. I used the state parti-
sanship data reported by Norrander (2001) as proxy for a party’s base support in each state for
the 1992 and 1996 U.S. presidential elections.
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Table 4.4 presents the percentage of candidate appearances in each battleground state in the
1992 and 1996 U.S. Presidential elections. The state partisanship data taken from Norrander (2001)
are presented in the second column, with the high partisanship number indicating a strong attach-
ment to the Republican Party and the low partisanship number indicating a strong attachment to
the Democratic Party. It is noteworthy that Shaw (1999b) categorizes LA, NV, and NM into “Bat-
tleground” for the 1996 U.S. presidential election. I therefore used the mean of the partisanship
numbers of LA, NV, and NM, which is 2.82, as the standard. States with the partisanship number
higher than 2.82 were categorized to have a stronger Republican party base, and states with the
partisanship number lower than 2.82 were categorized to have a stronger Democratic party base.
In other words, according to Hypothesis 1, states with the partisanship number higher (lower) than
2.82 are expected to have a higher percentage of democratic (republican) candidate appearances.
It is shown on Table 4.4 that in the 1992 U.S. Presidential election, twenty-three battlegrounds
received candidate appearances. Of these, fifteen are consistent with Hypothesis 1: CT, OR, ME,
MO, GA, FL, and NC have partisanship numbers higher than 2.82 and also have higher percent-
ages of democratic candidate appearances, and TN, LA, NM, WI, PA, AL, TX, and MT have
partisanship numbers lower than 2.82 and also have higher percentages of republican candidate
appearances. In other words, more than 65 percent of states in the 1992 U.S. Presidential election
are consistent with Hypothesis 1. With the same idea, Table 4.4 shows more than 72 percent of
states in the 1996 U.S. Presidential election are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
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Table 4.2: Candidate Appearances in Base Democratic States, 1988, 1992, and 1996
1996 1992 1988
State Rep. App. Dem. App. Rep. App. Dem. App. Rep. App. Dem. App.
AR 0 2.4 0 2.15 - -
CA -a - 1.12 3.23 - -
CT 2.21 0.8 - - - -
DC 5.15 10.4 0 0 0.88 4
DE 0 0 - - - -
HI 0 0 0 0 0 0
IL - - 2.25 3.23 - -
IA 2.21 1.6 1.12 1.08 0.88 0
MD 0 0 2.25 2.15 0.88 1.6
MA 0 1.6 1.12 1.08 2.63 9.6
ME 0 0.8 - - - -
MN 0 0.8 0 0 0 0
NY 0.74 5.6 1.12 2.15 - -
OR 0 1.6 - - - -
RI 0 0.8 0 0 0 0.8
VT 0 0 0 1.08 - -
WA 0 1.6 - - - -
WI 0 0.8 - - - -
WV 0 0.8 0 0 0 0
Number of Base
Democratic states 17 13 8
Number of states
w/ candidate app. 13 8 5
Number of states
w/ more Dem. app. 11 5 4
Fit of Hypothesis 2 0.846 0.625 0.8
a The sign “-” means that Shaw (1999b) does not categorize this state into “Base Democratic” in
the 1988, 1992, or 1996 U.S. presidential election.
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Table 4.3: Candidate Appearances in Base Republican States, 1988, 1992, and 1996
1996 1992 1988
State Rep. App. Dem. App. Rep. App. Dem. App. Rep. App. Dem. App.
AL 0.74 0.8 - - 0 0
AK 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR -a - - - 0.88 0.8
AZ - - 0 0 0 0
CO - - - - 4.39 3.2
FL - - - - 0 0
GA - - - - 0 0
LA - - - - 0 1.6
ID 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN 0 0 0 2.15 0.88 0
KS 2.21 0 0 0 0 0
KY - - - - 3.51 1.6
MS 0 0 1.12 1.08 0 0
MT 0 0 - - 0.88 0.8
NE 0.74 0 0 1.08 0.88 0
NV - - 0 1.08 0 0
NH - - 0 0 0 0
NM - - - - 0.88 0
NC 1.47 0.8 - - 0.88 1.6
ND 0 0 0 0 0 0
OK 0 0 2.25 0 0.88 0
SC 0.74 0 1.12 2.15 0 0
SD - - - - 0.88 2.4
TN - - - - 0.88 0.8
TX 1.47 3.2 - - - -
UT 0.74 0 1.12 1.08 0 0
VA - - 3.37 3.23 0 0.8
WY 0 5.6 0 0 0 0
Number of Base
Republican states 15 15 27
Number of states
w/ candidate app. 10 8 14
Number of states
w/ more Dem. app. 7 4 11
Fit of Hypothesis 2 0.7 0.5 0.786
a The sign “-” means that Shaw (1999b) does not categorize this state into “Base Republican” in
the 1988, 1992, or 1996 U.S. presidential election.
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Table 4.4: Candidate Appearances in Battleground States, 1992 and 1996
1996 1992
State Partisanship Rep. App. Dem. App. Rep. App. Dem. App.
AL 2.80 -a - 1.12 0
AZ 3.24 2.21 3.2 - -
CA 2.66 16.91 7.2 - -
CO 3.15 4.41 4.8 2.25 2.15
CT 2.97 - - 1.12 2.15
DE 3.09 - - 1.12 1.08
FL 3.26 8.09 4 3.37 5.38
GA 2.82 4.41 0.8 3.37 5.38
IL 2.90 4.41 4 - -
KY 2.85 3.68 4 4.49 3.23
LA 2.58 2.94 1.6 4.49 2.15
MI 3.02 3.68 4.8 10.11 8.6
ME 2.90 - - 0 1.08
MO 2.80 3.68 2.4 5.62 6.45
MT 2.78 0 0 1.12 0
NV 3.33 2.21 0.8 - -
NH 3.24 0.74 2.4 - -
NJ 3.15 4.41 2.4 5.62 5.38
NM 2.55 2.21 4 2.25 2.15
NC 2.94 - - 3.37 5.38
OH 2.69 6.62 8 6.74 7.53
OK 2.51 - - 2.25 0
OR 2.91 - - 1.12 2.15
PA 2.75 3.68 1.6 4.49 3.23
SD 3.06 0.74 1.6 2.25 1.08
TN 2.79 4.41 1.6 3.37 0
TX 2.91 - - 7.87 2.15
WA 2.91 - - 1.12 1.08
WI 2.63 - - 5.62 4.3
Number of
battleground states 19 23
Number of states
w/ candidate app. 18 23
Number of states
w/ Party Id < 2.82
and more Rep. app.
or w/ Party Id > 2.82
and more Dem. app. 13 15
Fit of Hypothesis 1 0.722 0.652
a The sign “-” means that Shaw (1999b) does not categorize this state into “Lean Republican,” “Battleground,”
or “Lean Democratic” in the 1992 or 1996 U.S. presidential election.
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4.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates candidates’ rallying strategies in two-party races. It views campaign rallies
as an information-revealing mechanism that allows candidates to project images of strong current
support among voters. Compared with previous studies on campaign effects, this research starts
from investigating voting behavior based on the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) (P-R) pivotal voter
model. Then, the mechanism through which the support is shown in rallies is demonstrated through
the informational impact in the P-R pivotal voter model.
There are two types of voters in the model: base supporters (those who always turn out to
vote for their preferred candidates) and passive supporters (those who vote strategically). The idea
is that if a candidate holds a rally, base supporters will automatically attend the rally organized
by the candidate they support, but passive supporters will stay away. Hence, by holding a rally,
candidates and supporters learn the realized number of the base supporters. Afterwards, passive
supporters decide whether or not to vote based on their observations of rally outcomes. Therefore,
candidates can use rallies to disseminate information about their chances of winning to make passive
supporters believe that their votes will change the election outcome, leading to their willingness to
vote.
According to the model, two hypotheses are derived: (1) when the sizes of the two parties are
equal but base support is unequal, the party with a smaller probability of strong base support is
more likely to hold a rally, and (2) when two parties are different in size but have the same chances
of strong base support, the larger party is more likely to hold a rally. To test the hypotheses, three
U.S. Presidential elections (1988, 1992, and 1996) are studied. Empirical analysis of these three
elections shows that in most of the battleground states, if partisanship leans to the Democratic
(Republican), the Republican (Democratic) Party organized more candidate appearances than the
Democratic (Republican) Party did, supporting Hypothesis 1. The empirical data also show that
in most of the Base Democratic (Republican) states, the Democratic (Republican) Party organized
more candidate appearances than the Republican (Democratic) Party did, supporting Hypothesis
2.
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Appendix A
Proofs, Individual Data, and the QRE
Simulation for Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For a player i of a team, say team A, given that there are NA contributors on team A and NB
contributors on team B. If i is a contributor and team A wins the competition, i’s utility is equal
to i’s material payoff minus some disutility that is generated by the difference between i’s payoff
and the payoff of free-riders,
( g
n
NA +
g
n
NB
)
;
if team A loses the competition, i’s utility is 0.
On the other hand, if i is a free-rider and team A wins the competition, i’s utility is equal to
i’s material payoff minus some disutility that is generated by the difference between i’s payoff and
the payoff of contributors,
(
1 +
g
n
NA +
g
n
NB
)
;
if team A loses the competition, i’s utility is 1.
To analyze the equilibria, let N∗A, N
∗
B denote the number of contributors on team A and the
number of contributors on team B, respectively, in equilibrium. Then, for a contributor i, the
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necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium is
{
(
1
2
+
N∗
A
−N∗
B
2n
)(
g
n
N∗A +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
−N∗
A
2n
)(0)
}
−
{
(
1
2
+
(N∗
A
− 1)−N∗
B
2n
)(1 +
g
n
(N∗A − 1) +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
− (N∗
A
− 1)
2n
)(1)
}
> 0 (1a)
Similarly, for a free-rider i, the necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium is
{
(
1
2
+
N∗
A
−N∗
B
2n
)(1 +
g
n
N∗A +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
−N∗
A
2n
)(1)
}
−
{
(
1
2
+
(N∗
A
+ 1)−N∗
B
2n
)(0 +
g
n
(N∗A + 1) +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
− (N∗
A
+ 1)
2n
)(0)
}
> 0 (2a)
In the same way, we can get similar equilibrium conditions for a player on team B with the
exchange N∗A and N
∗
B .
There are potentially two types of symmetric equilibria. One type has N∗A = N
∗
B = 0, and one
has N∗A = N
∗
B = n. The first is that no player chooses to contribute the token to the common
account in equilibrium; i.e., all players are free-riders. Substituting N∗A = N
∗
B = 0 into (2a), the
necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium is
g
n
6
2n
n+ 1
.
Next, consider the equilibrium whereN∗A = N
∗
B = n, which is that every player chooses to contribute
the token in equilibrium; i.e., all players are contributors. Substituting N∗A = N
∗
B = n into (1a),
the necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium is
g
n
>
2n
3n− 1
.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
When the parameter γi is considered, for a contributor i, the condition that should be satisfied in
equilibrium becomes
{
(
1
2
+
N∗
A
−N∗
B
2n
)(
g
n
N∗A +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
−N∗
A
2n
)(0)
}
−
{
(
1
2
+
(N∗
A
− 1)−N∗
B
2n
)(1 +
g
n
(N∗A − 1) +
g
n
N∗B) + (
1
2
+
N∗
B
− (N∗
A
− 1)
2n
)(1)− γi
}
> 0,
while the condition for a free-rider i is the same as what has been shown in the proof for Proposition 1.
Then, following the same ideas presented in the proof for Proposition 1, we can prove Proposition 2(a) and
Proposition 2(b).
A.3 Experimental Data at the Individual Level
Eighty participants participated in the TT treatment. For each participant i, let J denote i’s belief
about the number of contributors (not including i) on i’s own team and K denote and the the
number of contributors on i’s competing team. Given a pair of (J,K), I define “the percentage of
contributions in the (J,K) situation” for i as
# obs. that i contributed in the (J,K) situation
# obs. that i in the (J,K) situation
.
Among the 80 participants, 21 participants always stated J < K and contributed (Table A.1),
and 14 participants always stated J > K and never contributed (Table A.2). Let CJKi denote the
percentage of contributions of i when J > K and CKJi denote the percentage of contributions of
i when J < K. Thirty-one participants were with CJKi < C
KJ
i . More importantly, they always
contributed when J < K and seldom contributed when J > K (Table A.3). Fourteen participants
were with CJKi > C
KJ
i . As shown in Table A.4, they did not show a significant difference in
contribution between when J < K and when J > K. In summary, most of the participants were
substantially more willing to contribute when J < K than when J > K, and this contribution
behavior did not change with the sizes of J and K.
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Table A.1: Percentage of beliefs of the participants who always contributed
K, J 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0.043 0.010 0
2 0.014 0.15 0.143 0.033
3 0 0.024 0.410 0.048
4 0 0.005 0.024 0.095
* This table presents the percentages of beliefs of the participants who always contributed.
For example, when J = K = 2, the number in the table is 0.143. It means that 30
observations reported J = K = 2, leading to a percentage of 0.143, or 30
210
.
Table A.2: Percentage of beliefs of the participants who never contributed
K, J 0 1 2 3
0 0.214 0.007 0 0
1 0.014 0.2 0.014 0
2 0 0.093 0.307 0.007
3 0 0 0.029 0.093
4 0.014 0 0 0.007
* This table presents the percentage of beliefs of the participants who never contributed.
For example, when J = K = 2, the number in the table is 0.307. It means that 43
observations reported J = K = 2, leading to a percentage of 0.307, or 43
140
.
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Table A.3: Percentage of contributions of the participants with CJKi < C
KJ
i
K, J 0 1 2 3
0 0.17, 16 0.00,
0
1 0.00,
0
1 1.00,
1
1
1 0.83, 56 0.05,
1
20 0.00,
0
4 0.00,
0
1
2 -, 00 0.68,
28
41 0.18,
10
57 0.00,
0
3
3 1.00, 22 0.75,
3
4 0.73,
55
75 0.14,
5
37
4 -, 00 1.00,
1
1 1.00,
6
6 0.93,
13
14
* This table presents the percentages of contributions of the participants with CJKi < C
KJ
i .
For example, when J = K = 2, the numbers in the table are 0.18 and 10
57
. It means that
there are 57 observations reporting J = K = 2, and the contribution percentage is 0.18,
or 10
57
.
Table A.4: Percentage of contributions of the participants with CJKi > C
KJ
i
K, J 0 1 2 3
0 1.00, 22 0.00,
0
1 1.00,
1
1 -,
0
0
1 0.33, 13 0.75,
6
8 0.67,
6
9 1.00,
1
1
2 0.00, 03 0.48,
12
25 0.52,
14
27 0.70,
7
10
3 1.00, 11 0.55,
5
9 0.57,
12
21 0.47,
8
17
4 0.33, 13 0.50,
1
2 -,
0
0 1.00,
7
7
* This table presents the percentages of contributions of the participants with CJKi > C
KJ
i .
For example, when J = K = 2, the numbers in the table are 0.52 and 14
27
. It means that
there are 27 observations reporting J = K = 2, and the contribution percentage is 0.52,
or 14
27
.
A.4 Estimation and Quantal Response Equilibrium
In the following model I use player i on team A as an example. Recall that in the team tournament
model, teams compete against each other for prizes that are shared equally among team members.
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The set of competition outcomes to player i is denoted by C1 = {w, l} if i chooses to contribute
and is denoted by C0 = {w, l} if i chooses not to contribute, where w represents that team A wins
the competition and l represents that team A loses the competition. Suppose that there are J
contributors (not including i) on team A and K contributors on team B. Then, the set of events
to player i is denoted by Z = C1 × C0. Let P
A
JK = {p
A
bd(J,K) : b ∈ C1, d ∈ C0} be the set of
probability measures on Z where pAbd(J,K) is calculated by the distribution function F (ǫ
h) that
satisfies equation (2.3) and
∑
b∈C1
∑
d∈C0
pAbd(J,K) = 1. More specifically, according to equation
(2.3),
PAww(J,K) =
∫ ∫
I{[yA > yB|J,K, xAi = 1]
⋂
[yA > yB |J,K, xAi = 0]}dǫ
AdǫB
=
∫ ∫
I{[ǫB − ǫA < 1 + J −K]
⋂
[ǫB − ǫA < J −K]}dǫAdǫB
=
∫ ∫
I{ǫB − ǫA < J −K}dǫAdǫB
= Pr(ǫB − ǫA < J −K) =
1
2
+
J −K
2n
,
PAll (J,K) =
∫ ∫
I{[yA < yB|J,K, xAi = 1]
⋂
[yA < yB |J,K, xAi = 0]}dǫ
AdǫB
=
∫ ∫
I{[ǫB − ǫA > 1 + J −K]
⋂
[ǫB − ǫA > J −K]}dǫAdǫB
=
∫ ∫
I{ǫB − ǫA > 1 + J −K}dǫAdǫB
= 1− Pr(ǫB − ǫA < K − J − 1) =
1
2
+
K − J − 1
2n
,
PAlw(J,K) =
∫ ∫
I{[yA < yB |J,K, xAi = 1]
⋂
[yA > yB|J,K, xAi = 0]}dǫ
AdǫB
=
∫ ∫
I{[ǫB − ǫA > 1 + J −K]
⋂
[ǫB − ǫA < J −K]}dǫAdǫB = 0,
PAwl(J,K) =
∫ ∫
I{[yA > yB |J,K, xAi = 1]
⋂
[yA < yB|J,K, xAi = 0]}dǫ
AdǫB
= 1− PAww(J,K)− P
A
ll (J,K)− P
A
lw(J,K) =
1
2n
.
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For an element (b, d) ∈ Z, let uAbdi1(J,K, γi) denote i’s payoff when i chooses to contribute and
the event is (b, d). Similarly, let uAbdi0(J,K, γi) denote i’s payoff when i chooses not to contribute.
Therefore, given that there are J contributors (not including i) on team A and K contributors on
team B, if i decides to contribute effort, the expected payoff (denoted as EUAC (γ) in the main text)
will be
uAi1(J,K, γi) =
∑
b∈C1
∑
d∈C0
pAbd(J,K)× u
A
bdi1(J,K, γi), (A.1)
where uAbdi1(J,K, γi) can be calculated according to equations (2.4) and (2.5). To allow a small
amount of bounded rationality, let
uˆAia(J,K, γi) = u
A
ia(J,K, γi) + η
A
ia
where the vector of perturbations ηAi = (η
A
i1, η
A
i0) is drawn from a joint density fi. Based on
individual choice behavior research (Luce (1959); McFadden (1973); McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)),
assume that every ηAia is an independent draw from an extreme value distribution with cumulative
density function Fi(η
A
ia) = e
−e−λη
A
ia−α , where α is Euler’s constant, and ηAia is i.i.d. across all a
yielding the logit choice probabilities. Therefore, given that there are J contributors (not including
i) on team A and K contributors on team B, the probability that i decides to contribute effort is
Pr(uˆAi1(J,K, γi) > uˆ
A
i0(J,K, γi)) =
eλu
A
i1(J,K,γi)
eλu
A
i1(J,K,γi) + eλu
A
i0(J,K,γi)
. (A.2)
Let σAi1(J,K, γi, λ) denote the probability that i contributes effort. Note that the parameter λ is
the inverse of the error level.
From the experiment I derived each participant’s decision–shia, i = 1, ..., n, a ∈ {1, 0}, h ∈
{A,B}, and each participant’s beliefs about the number of contributors on his or her own team
and the number of contributors on the competing team–jhi and k
h
i for each period. Given these
observations, the parameters γi and λ can be estimated by a maximum likelihood method. However,
it is difficult to obtain accurate estimates of these subject-specific parameters for each individual
since the data were insufficient. Hence, I assumed that γi = γ for all participants. The maximum
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likelihood estimates of γ and λ then can be obtained by the following log-likelihood function:
lnL(γ, λ|shi1, j
h
i , k
h
i ) =
∑
h∈{A,B}
n∑
i=1
shi1 ln
[
σhi1(j
h
i , k
h
i , γ, λ)
]
+ (1− shi1) ln
[
(1− σhi1(j
h
i , k
h
i , γ, λ))
]
.
(A.3)
Using the participants’ contribution decision and belief data, I obtained maximum-likelihood pa-
rameter estimates (and standard errors) for the group envy utility function: γ = 0.43 (0.0012), and
λ = 4.99 (0.0201), with a log-likelihood of −447.306.
Next, I show how to calculate the quantal response equilibrium (QRE). Let the set of pure
strategies available to player i on team A to be denoted by SAi = {s
A
i1, s
A
i0}, with S = ×
h
i S
h
i and
h ∈ {A,B}, where sAi1 means that i chooses to contribute effort, and s
A
i0 indicates no contribution.
Let ∆Ai denote the set of all probability measures on S
A
i . Let ∆ = ×
h
i∆
h
i denote the set of
probability measures on S, with elements q = (qA1 , ..., q
A
n , q
B
1 , ..., q
B
n ). For simplicity, let q
A
ia represent
qAi (s
A
ia). Consider a symmetric logit QRE, where q
h
i1 = π for i = 1, ..., n and h ∈ {A,B}. Then, in
equilibrium the probability that player i chooses to contribute effort becomes
qAi1 = π =
eλu
A
i1(pi,γ)
eλu
A
i1(pi,γ) + eλu
A
i0(pi,γ)
, (A.4)
where
uAia(π, γ) =
n∑
k=0
n−1∑
j=0
πj+k(1− π)2n−1−j−k
(
n− 1
j
)(
n
k
)
× uAia(j, k, γ), a ∈ {0, 1},
where uAia(j, k, γ) can be calculated according to equations (A.1), (2.4), and (2.5). As equation
(A.4) shows, the QRE probability π depends on the values of parameters γ and λ. Since there are
more than one parameter in equation (A.4), the parameters cannot be identified if using equation
(A.4) to compute the maximum likelihood estimates. Therefore, I simulated the QRE probability
π using the same parameter values as given in the preceding paragraph. Substituting γ = 0.43 and
λ = 4.99 into equation (A.4) gives the QRE probability π = 0.568.
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Appendix B
Figures and Tables for Chapter 2
B.1 Figures and Tables
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Figure B.1: Treatment CC Cutpoint CDF
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Figure B.2: Treatment CP Cutpoint CDF
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Figure B.3: Treatment PC Cutpoint CDF
Table B.1: Fraction of Positive Paired Cutoff Differences
Within-Subject Competition Effect
CCTie1−CCMajority CCTie1−CCMinority CCTie3−CCMajority CCTie3−CCMinority
0.462 (0.1) 0.731 (2.6) 0.769 (2.2) 0.962 (4.6)
Within-Subject Size Effect Within-Subject Underdog Effect
CCTie3−CCTie1 CCMinority−CCMajority
0.808 (2.1) 0.192 (-2.5)
Note: With the estimated cutpoint for each subject, I followed Table 6 of Levine and Palfrey (2007) to
consider the difference in each subject’s cutpoint between being in different situations in the CC treatment,
and calculate the fraction of these differences that are positive to test H1-H3. As can be seen, when subjects
were in CCMajority, their cutpoints were higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction, leading to failure to
support the hypotheses of the CCTie1−CCMajority competition effect and the underdog effect. This finding
is consistent with the analysis of H1-H3 hypotheses at the aggregate level. (Average difference in parentheses.)
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Table B.2: Probit Regressions (Marginal Effects Reported): No Majority Situation
Dependent variable: Vote CC CP PC
Voting Cost -0.130∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0163) (0.0132)
Period -0.00429∗∗ -0.00297 0.000621
(0.00204) (0.00198) (0.00176)
Belief of being Pivotal 0.207∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.184∗
(0.0998) (0.124) (0.102)
Voted at t-1 0.00251 -0.00164 0.0983
(0.0591) (0.0755) (0.0766)
Won at t-1 -0.00372 -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.00655
(0.00310) (0.00518) (0.00409)
Voted and Won at t-1 0.00705 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.00243
(0.00457) (0.00526) (0.00579)
Tie1 Situation -0.333∗∗∗
(0.0765)
Minority Situation -0.662∗∗∗ 0.0470 0.0135
(0.0927) (0.0661) (0.0515)
FaceMinority Situation 0.195∗∗∗ 0.0817
(0.0525) (0.0574)
N 808 809 830
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure B.4: Stated Lead CDF: CCMajority
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Figure B.5: Frequency Distribution of Stated Leads: CPMajority
Figure B.6: Stated Lead CDF: CPMajority
Figure B.7: Frequency Distribution of Stated Leads: PCMajority
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Figure B.8: Stated Lead CDF: PCMajority
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Appendix C
Conditional Winning Probabilities for
Chapter 3
C.1 The Conditional Winning Probabilities
First, if there are n passive supporters, and each passive supporter has a probability p of voting,
then the probability of an event in which exactly k passive supporters turn out to vote is denoted
as
Pp(k|p, n) =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k.
Note that in the case that n = 0, p is not well-defined since there are no passive supporters. In
such cases, Pp(k|p, n) = 1 and
∑
k Pp(k|p, n) = 1, thus ensuring that the formulas in the following
sections are well-defined. Second, suppose there are n voters, and that each individual voter is
either a base supporter (π probability) or passive supporter (1 − π probability), and that each
passive supporter turns out to vote with probability p. In this scenario, the probability of exactly
k voters casting their ballots is denoted as
Pall(k|p, π, n) =
k∑
x=0
(
n
x, k − x, n− k
)
πx((1 − π)p)k−x((1 − π)(1− p))n−k.
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C.1.1 Both Candidates Hold Rallies
Let (c∗1, c
∗
2), (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) and (q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) denote the equilibrium values of (cˆ1, cˆ2), (pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2) re-
spectively.
Given R1 base supporters attending the rally held by candidate 1 and R2 base supporters
attending the rally held by candidate 2, the probability of a passive supporter in party T1 or T2
making or breaking a tie is expressed as
q∗1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=max{R1,R2}
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1 − 1) · Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=r1
{
Pp(k −R1|p1,
∗N1 −R1 − 1) · Pp(k + 1−R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
(C.1)
q∗2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=max{R1,R2}
{
Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2 − 1) · Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=r2
{
Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2 − 1) · Pp(k + 1−R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1)
}
(C.2)
where ri = max{R1, R2} − 1 if Ri < Rj, otherwise ri = max{R1, R2}. From equations (4.1)-(4.4),
(C.1) and (C.2) it is possible to solve the aggregate voting probability of passive supporters for
each party, (p∗1, p
∗
2).
When both candidates conduct rallies in the first stage and when R1 = N1 and R2 = N2,
Prob1(tie|R1, R2) = 1 if N1 = N2, Prob1(win|R1, R2) = 1 if N1 > N2 and Prob1(lose|R1, R2) = 1
if N1 < N2. In all other cases,
Prob1(tie|R1, R2) =
min{N1,N2}∑
k=max{R1,R2}
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1) · Pp(k −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
,
P rob1(win|R1, R2) =
N1∑
k=r
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗
1, N1 −R1) ·
∑N1
y=1 Pp(k − y −R2|p
∗
2, N2 −R2)
}
,
where r = max{R1, R2 + 1} if R2 = N2, otherwise r = R1.
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C.1.2 Only One Candidate Holds a Rally
Let (c∗∗1 , c
∗∗
2 ), (p
∗∗
1 , p
∗∗
2 ) and (q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) be the equilibrium values of (cˆ1, cˆ2), (pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2)
respectively.
Without loss of generality, assume that candidate 1 conducts a rally and candidate 2 does not.
Recall that a randomly chosen voter in T2 may be a base supporter (π2 probability) or a passive
supporter (1 − π2 probability). Given π2 and R1 base supporters attending the candidate 1 rally,
equations (C.1) and (C.2) become
q∗∗1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1 − 1) · Pall(k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1 − 1) · Pall(k + 1|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2)
}
(C.3)
q∗∗2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=R1
{
Pall(k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2 − 1) · Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=max{R1−1,0}
{
Pall(k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2 − 1) · Pp(k + 1−R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1)
}
(C.4)
According to equations (4.1)-(4.4), (C.3) and (C.4), it is possible to solve the aggregate voting
probability for passive supporters in each party, (p∗∗1 , p
∗∗
2 ), in this case.
Given that candidate 1 holds a rally and candidate 2 does not,
Prob1(tie|R1, ∅) =
min{N1,N2}∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1) · Pall(k|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2)
}
,
P rob1(win|R1, ∅) =
N1∑
k=R1
{
Pp(k −R1|p
∗∗
1 , N1 −R1) ·
∑N1
y=1 Pall(k − y|p
∗∗
2 , π2, N2)
}
.
C.1.3 Neither Candidate Holds a Rally
Let (c˜1, c˜2), (p˜1, p˜2) and (q˜1, q˜2) be the equilibrium values of (cˆ1, cˆ2), (pˆ1, pˆ2) and (qˆ1, qˆ2), respec-
tively.
Given that a randomly chosen voter in T1 may be a base supporter (π1 probability) or a passive
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supporter (1 − π1 probability), and a randomly chosen voter in T2 may be a base supporter (π2
probability) or a passive supporter (1− π2 probability), equations (C.1) and (C.2) become
q˜1 =
min{N1−1,N2}∑
k=0
{
Pall(k|p˜1, π1, N1 − 1) · Pall(k|p˜2, π2, N2)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
Pall(k|p˜1, π1, N1 − 1) · Pall(k + 1|p˜2, π2, N2)
}
(C.5)
q˜2 =
min{N1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
Pall(k|p˜2, π2, N2 − 1) · Pall(k|p˜1, π1, N1)
}
+
min{N1−1,N2−1}∑
k=0
{
Pall(k|p˜2, π2, N2 − 1) · Pall(k + 1|p˜1, π1, N1)
}
(C.6)
According to equations (4.1)-(4.4), (C.5) and (C.6), it is possible to solve the aggregate voting
probability of passive supporters for each party, (p˜1, p˜2), in this case.
If neither candidate holds a rally,
Prob1(tie|∅, ∅) =
min{N1,N2}∑
k=0
{
Pall(k|p˜1, π1, N1) · Pall(k|p˜2, π2, N2)
}
,
P rob1(win|∅, ∅) =
N1∑
k=1
{
Pall(k|p˜1, π1, N1) ·
∑N1
y=1 Pall(k − y|p˜2, π2, N2)
}
.
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Appendix D
Computation of pi for Chapter 3
D.1 Compute pi1 and pi2
Cheng (2007) use 2004 and 2005 TEDS data to show that base DPP supporters constituted approx-
imately 20% of the electorate, and that the probability of a base DPP supporter voting for DPP
candidates was approximately 90%, inferring that DPP base supporters represented approximately
18% of the electorate (0.2×0.9 = 0.18). However, ratios of base supporters to electorates (hereafter,
B/E ratio) can change over time, therefore for the 2008 presidential election we also calculated a
B/E ratio based on 2008 TEDS data. TEDS data include Taiwanese consciousness and the party
preference data, but not Taiwanese regime data. Using Cheng’s method, for the party identification
index we determined that 21.78% of 2008 voters were DPP identifiers. This figure was used as an
upper boundary for DPP B/E ratio.
Since there is no existing data on KMT base supporters, I measured the ratio of KMT base
supporters to the overall electorate by calculating Cheng’s indices with 2008 TEDS data. For the
first index (the Taiwanese and Chinese consciousness), the number of KMT base supporters identi-
fied from the Chinese consciousness data was approximately 5.1% of the electorate. The number of
KMT identifiers according to the third index (party preferenc) was 27.47% of the electorate. Since
TEDS does not have the necessary data for calculating the second index for 2008, it was assumed
from the first and third indices that KMT base supporters constituted between 5.1% and 27.47%
of the overall electorate.
The π1 and π2 values for the N2 = 2N1 case are computed in the following way. Since π1 ×
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N1/N¯ = 0.18, N¯ = N1 + N2 = 3N1, π1 = 0.18 × 3 = 0.55. From π1 × N1/N¯ = 0.2178, π1 =
0.6534. Also, π2 × N2/N¯ = 0.051, N = N1 + N2 = 1.5N2 and π2 = 0.051 × 1.5 = 0.0765. From
π2×N2/N¯ = 0.2747, π2 = 0.41205. The π1 and π2 values for the N2 = N1+1 case are computed in
the following way. According to Cheng (2007) Table 8, the DPP and KMT B/E ratios are ranged
from 18.0%-23.8% and 6.3%-21.8%, respectively. Since π1×N1/N¯ = 0.18, N = N1+N2 = 2N1+1,
π1 ≈ 0.18 × 2 = 0.36. From π1 × N1/N¯ = 0.238, π1 ≈ 0.476. Also, π2 × N2/N¯ = 0.063,
N¯ = N1 +N2 = 2N2 − 1 and π2 ≈ 0.063 × 2 = 0.126. From π2 ×N2/N¯ = 0.218, π2 ≈ 0.436.
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